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I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of "future claimants"' plagues the resolution of mass tort
bankruptcies. 2 Mass tort injuries, such as those caused by asbestos expo-
sure, can entail long and variable lag times between the exposure to a harm-
ful product and the resultant harm? As a result, some claimants may be
unaware of their injury at the time of a company's bankruptcy reorganiza-
tion.' Moreover, the total number and magnitude of future claims is subject
to great uncertainty Any resolution of mass tort claims in bankruptcy (or
via the legislative creation of a mass tort trust fund)6 must ensure a "fair dis-
tribution" for these ill-defined future claimants-an exceedingly difficult
task.'
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I Future claimants include all persons who are (or will be) injured as a result of contact with a harm-
ful product produced by a bankrupt company, but have not yet filed claims against the company for per-
sonal injuries or property damage. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 BR. 743, 744-45 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS:
NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION FINAL REPORT 316 (1997) [hereinafter NBRC REPORT]
(offering a proposed statutory definition of future claims).
2 See Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE L.J. 367,
369 (1994) (describing how fairness to future claimants complicates the treatment of asbestos liability in
both bankruptcy and class action negotiations).
3 See, e.g., Alan Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass
Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045, 2045 (2000) (describing the "long latency period between per-
son's use or exposure to a harmful product and the first manifestation of harm").
4 See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. at 743, 745.
5 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 847 (1984) (describ-
ing the epidemiological uncertainties).
6 See, e.g., Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2003, S. 1125, 108th Cong. (2003) [here-
inafter FAIR Act].
7 In the asbestos context, fair treatment for future claimants of mass tort bankruptcy trust funds is
mandated by statute. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V) (2000) (requiring that a trust fund "provide
reasonable assurance the trust will value and be in a financial position to pay present claims and future
demands that involve similar claims in substantially the same manner").
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The asbestos-related bankruptcy of the Johns-Manville Corporation
("Manville") exemplifies the difficulties of protecting future claimants.
Manville's Chapter 11 reorganization plan included a trust fund designated
to compensate future claimants.8 The trust fund was rapidly depleted, how-
ever, when the number of claimants and size of claims greatly exceeded ex-
pectations. 9  As a result, late-arriving claimants received far less
compensation than early claimants, which is an inequitable outcome.' Fear
of such shrunken payments may be one factor that rouses exposed, but un-
harmed, individuals to seek damages immediately, thereby protecting them-
selves from an unwelcome future: that they will ultimately develop the
injury only to be denied compensation because all available funds have
been depleted."
Mass tort bankruptcies involving future claimants are increasingly
prevalent. 2 Asbestos liability alone has been implicated in the bankruptcy
declarations of at least sixty corporations. 3 The pending legislative trust
fund for resolving asbestos claims shares many characteristics with these
bankruptcies and must also confront the problem of future claimants. 4 In
addition to asbestos, there are numerous potential applications in which
considerations of future claimants are important. Given the tidal wave of
litigation surrounding tobacco firms and the long lag time between cigarette
smoking and illness, it is quite-likely that future claimants will be a major
8 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
9 In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 752-62 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), va-
cated on other grounds, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993) [hereinafter
Asbestos Litig.].
10 MANVILLE PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT TRUST, HISTORY, available at
www.mantrust.org/history.htm (last visited May 12, 2004).
11 See generally Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class
Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 749, 766; Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries
in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 541, 550 (1992).
12 As explained by Resnick, mass torts involving thousands of victims make individualized trials
prohibitively expensive. Resnick, supra note 3, at 2045. The class action "solution" to this problem has
been complicated by the difficulty of creating binding classes including future claimants as a result of
the Amchem v. Windsor decision. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). The obvious alternative to class-action settle-
ments is bankruptcy negotiations, which enable companies to discharge their claims. For examples, see
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Rapid Am. Corp. (In re Celotex Corp.), 124 F.3d 619, 622 (4th Cir. 1997), In re
Keene Corp., 208 B.R. 112 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997), and In re Eagle-Picher Indus., 197 B.R. 260
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996). Although this Article focuses on bankruptcy and bankruptcy-related trust
funds, many of our recommendations would potentially assuage some of the doubts regarding class ac-
tion settlements involving future claimants that were expressed by the Supreme Court in Amchem. For a
description of these concerns, see Alex Raskolnikov, Note, Is There a Future for Future Claimants After
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor?, 107 YALE L.J 2545 (1998).
13 Joseph Treaster, Insurer Adds Two Billion to Asbestos Reserve, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2003, at C 1.
14 See, e.g., Solving the Asbestos Litigation Crisis: S. 1125, the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolu-
tion Act of 2003 Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003), at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/printtestimony.cfm?id=777&wit id=2180 [hereinafter Hearings on Asbestos
Litigation] (testimony of Professor Eric D. Green, applying the lessons learned in mass tort bankruptcies
to the asbestos trust fund legislation).
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issue should large tobacco firms be forced into bankruptcy or class-action
settlement negotiations. The Catholic Archdiocese of Boston may also be a
candidate for a bankruptcy trust, given the number of molestation-related
claims against it and the possibility of many claimants failing to come for-
ward immediately. 5
This Article makes the assumption that an early bankruptcy filing or
the prompt creation by legislation of a mass tort trust fund"6 will be efficient
and socially advantageous in most mass tort contexts, in spite of the prob-
lems created by future claimants. 7 Early bankruptcy filings can protect fu-
ture claimants, enhance firm value, and reduce legal costs. When a firm
facing large future tort liabilities delays a filing, it must compensate present
15 See Stephen Kurkjian & Walter Robinson, The Cardinal Resigns/Finances Deposition May Wait
if Chapter 11 Filing Is Put Off BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 14,2002, at Al.
16 While this Article will generally focus upon mass tort bankruptcies, the similarities of the FAIR
Act, supra note 6, to mass tort bankruptcies ensure that the arguments developed here apply directly to
the proposed legislative trust fund for asbestos. For example, the FAIR Act states that its purpose is "to
create a fair and efficient system to resolve claims of victims for bodily injury caused by asbestos expo-
sure, and for other purposes." See S. 1125 pmbl. This statement echoes the rationales put forth for mass
tort bankruptcy. See, e.g., infra articles cited in note 17.
17 For articles advocating the use of Chapter II as an efficient means of accommodating mass tort
cases, see S. ELIZABETH GIBSON, MASS TORT LIMITED FUND CLASS ACTIONS & BANKRUPTCY
NEGOTIATIONS 199 (Federal Judicial Center 2000), at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ Mass-
Tort.pdf/$file/MassTort.pdf (suggesting that "because bankruptcy reorganizations provide an inherently
fairer method of resolving mass tort claims [than class action settlements] ... policy makers focus on
ways to make bankruptcy more efficient"); Stuart M. Bernstein, Mass Torts and Bankruptcy,
LITIGATION, Fall 1997, at 5; Barbara J. Houser, Chapter 11 as a Mass Tort Solution, 31 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 451 (1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1457-61 (1995) (arguing that bankruptcy gives better procedural protections to
mass tort victims); Ralph R. Mabey & Peter A. Zisser, Improving Treatment of Future Claims: The Un-
finished Business Left by the Manville Amendments, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 487 (1995) (advocating the use
of Chapter 11, but suggesting that a more comprehensive framework for mass tort bankruptcies be de-
veloped); Resnick, supra note 3; Roe, supra note 5; Smith, supra note 2, at 433 (although Smith does
not entirely endorse bankruptcy as an efficient mass tort process); Bob Van Voris, Bankruptcy in Lieu of
Settlements?, NAT'L L.J., July 28, 1997, at AI, A21 (arguing that bankruptcy offers better protection of
future claimants than settlements because bankruptcy arrangements are subject to greater scrutiny). See
also Hearings on Asbestos Litigation, supra note 14, at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
print testimony.cfm?id=777&wit id=2186 (testimony of Jennifer Biggs, describing the billions of dol-
lars in efficiencies that will be achieved by the creation of an asbestos trust fund). But see Joseph F.
Rice & Nancy Worth Davis, The Future of Mass Tort Claims: Comparison of Settlement Class Action
to Bankruptcy Treatment of Mass Tort Claims, 50 S.C. L. REV. 405, 410 (1999) (preferring the use of
class action settlements with respect to bankruptcy because bankruptcy involves long delays). More-
over, this Article shares another feature in common with all of these articles: it examines mass tort
bankruptcy from an "ex-post" perspective; that is, it takes the mass tort as a given and does not analyze
the impact of mass tort bankruptcy procedures on incentives to take precautions. For articles that ana-
lyze this element of mass torts procedures, see David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing
Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1996) (suggesting that deterrence
motives may justify "collectivizing" mass exposure cases); and Rohan Pitchford, How Liable Should a
Lender Be?: The Case of Judgment-Proof Firms and Environmental Risk, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1171
(1995) (explaining how higher liability for lenders within bankruptcy may lead to greater incentives for
firms to risk mass tort injuries).
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claimants in full. This procedure ensures that future claimants will be rela-
tively under-compensated if the firm becomes insolvent at a later date. In
addition, it may be very difficult for a firm to obtain capital for new invest-
ments. For example, a firm's long-term prospects may become uncertain
due to its tort liabilities,"' raising the possibility that it will decline poten-
tially profitable investment opportunities. This inefficiency may reduce the
value of the assets available to compensate tort claimants and other credi-
tors.
Mass tort bankruptcies have yet to "solve" the problem of future
claimants, however. Two aspects of the future claimants' problem are par-
ticularly vexing. First, future claimants are not adequately represented in
bankruptcy negotiations. Representatives for present claimants and other
creditors aggressively pursue their clients' interest. These representatives
can be monitored by their clients. In addition, the representatives' compen-
sation and future job prospects may depend on their success in the negotia-
tions. Future claimants' identities, by contrast, are unknown. They do not
choose, monitor, or compensate their representatives. Instead, these func-
tions are performed by the bankruptcy court, which appoints and pays a fu-
ture claimants' representative. In light of these disparities, it is hardly
surprising that the funds available for future claimants are frequently inade-
quate (as in the Manville example). If future claimants' interests are to be
adequately protected in mass tort bankruptcies, the representation problem
must be addressed.
However, a second complexity ensures that effective representation of
future claimants does not solve the "fair distribution" problem. Uncertainty
in the number and size of future claims makes any compensation scheme
for tort claimants subject to massive inequities if future claims differ from
expectations. 9 Moreover, delayed payment to early tort claimants is no so-
lution, Currently injured present claimants may have pressing liquidity
needs (such as medical expenses) that demand immediate compensation."
An effective mass tort bankruptcy procedure must effectively account for
this uncertainty and allocate the risk fairly between present claimants, fu-
ture claimants, and other creditors.
Two incisive articles suggest improvements to current methods of deal-
ing with these issues. Professors Mark Roe and Thomas Smith both de-
velop creative proposals (described in more detail below) to improve the
procedures for estimating future claims when awarding payments to present
18 See NBRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 315.
19 One commentator has described uncertainty as the core problem of mass tort litigation. See Peter
H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 941, 948-50
(1995).
20 See, e.g., Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1987) (dis-
cussing the emergency treatment needs of present claimants injured by the Dalkon Shield); Smith, supra
note 2, at 387.
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claimants or other creditors.2 These improved estimation procedures miti-
gate the defects in future claimants' representation. Indeed, these methods
aim to equalize payments between present and future claimants and seek to
avoid a recurrence of the Manville bankruptcy, wherein future claimants
were woefully under-compensated. Either method would constitute a con-
siderable advance over the current ad hoc procedures, reducing or eliminat-
ing some of the biases that currently favor present claimants.22
Nevertheless, the Roe and Smith proposals share some critical flaws
with current practice. While they attempt to mitigate the damage to future
claimants from inadequate representation, they fail to ameliorate the fun-
damental representation problem. In the Roe and Smith proposals, incen-
tives for the representatives of future claimants are feeble-they will remain
ineffective advocates as compared to the representatives of other claimants.
Instead of addressing this flaw directly, the Roe and Smith proposals at-
tempt to mitigate its consequences. While these solutions may reduce the
potential for inequitable payments to future claimants, they can never
eliminate the inequities entirely. Moreover, the Roe and Smith proposals
both require relatively elaborate innovations to current bankruptcy practice.
These procedures are subject to manipulation that would harm future claim-
ants' interests if they are ineffectively represented.
Mass tort bankruptcy negotiations allocate risk as well as value. Be-
cause the size of future claims is uncertain and the pool of funds set aside
for claimants is necessarily limited, the value available per creditor is also
uncertain. In general, financial theory indicates that riskier assets should
yield higher returns. Thus, the compensation of the group of creditors bear-
ing the future claims risk should yield a higher average return, reflecting the
uncertainty in returns. Current bankruptcy practice, the pending asbestos
trust fund and the Roe and Smith proposals all allocate this risk poorly and
unfairly. At present, the risk is borne primarily by future claimants. Under
current practice, each future claimant's per capita compensation is lower if
aggregate future claims are higher. Because future claimants are likely to
be risk-averse (like most other creditors),23 they need to be compensated for
bearing this risk. And yet they are not compensated. For example, in the
Manville bankruptcy, future claimants were offered no premium over pre-
21 Roe improves the estimation procedures by delaying some payments to present claimants through
a procedure analogous to a variable annuity wherein claimants get their payments over a period of time
rather than instantaneously. The delay allows payments to be more accurately awarded after some of the
uncertainty in the size of future claims has been resolved. See Roe, supra note 5, at 870-73. Smith, by
contrast, employs the information processing capabilities of the capital markets to generate more accu-
rate estimations. Smith, supra note 2. For more detailed descriptions of both papers, see Parts I.B. and
lI.B.
22 In the Manville bankruptcy, the size of the trust fund was determined through bargaining between
representatives of present claimants, future claimants, and other creditors. See KEVIN DELANEY,
STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY 71-81 (1992).
23 Roe, supra note 5, at 877; Smith, supra note 2, at 380.
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sent claimants, in spite of the fact that future claimants' payments were sub-
ject to much greater risk.24 This state of affairs is reprised in the Fairness in
Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2003 ("FAIR") which inequitably "shifts
risks and uncertainties" to future claimants.
25
Similarly, the Roe and Smith proposals attempt to ensure that present
claimants and future claimants receive the same compensation on average.26
For example, if the amount of compensation to future claimants will be ei-
ther 10 or 20, each with a 50% probability (an average of 15), then the Roe
and Smith proposals would insist that present claimants be awarded 15.
Assuming all claimants are risk-averse, this compensation structure is un-
fair to future claimants. Risk-averse individuals would prefer the certain
payment of 15 (awarded to present claimants) over the risky payment with
an average value of 15 (awarded to future claimants). Moreover, future
claimants can not diversify this risk because they do not know that they will
be harmed. Thus, the Roe and Smith proposals maintain some of the biases
favoring present claimants that they seek to avoid. Given the high levels of
epidemiological uncertainty and severe nature of mass tort injuries, it is
likely that claimants are particularly risk-averse in this context, which sug-
gests that this bias in favor of present claimants is an important one.
Proper treatment of the risk aversion of claimants has additional impli-
cations for mass tort bankruptcies. Even if future claimants in the Manville
bankruptcy had been awarded a premium for bearing the future claims risk,
the Manville settlement would still have produced an inefficient allocation
of risk. If future claimants are more risk-averse than other creditors, then
they should be allocated the least amount of risk possible. Here too, the
Manville bankruptcy settlement (as well as all others) is defective. In addi-
tion to poorly estimating the number of future claimants and failing to com-
pensate future claimants for bearing excess risk, the Manville settlement
had the highest-cost risk bearers (the future claimants) bearing the most
risk. Had the future claims risk been allocated to other creditors, the risk-
bearing premium necessary to assure fair treatment for all creditors would
have been considerably smaller. Instead, the risk was inefficiently borne by
the future claimants, rather than other creditors (who are more plausibly
risk-neutral with respect to the number of claimants, due to their ability to
diversify more effectively).
In Part II, we examine the effectiveness of future claimants' represen-
tation. We first discuss and evaluate the outcome of the Johns-Manville
24 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 628 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (asserting that the
Manville trust compensated present and future claimants in full, but failing to note that future claimants'
compensation was subject to more risk and therefore occasionally entitled to greater than full compensa-
tion).
25 See, e.g., Hearings on Asbestos Litigation, supra note 14, at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
print testimony.cfm?id=777&wit id=2189 (testimony of Dr. Mark A. Peterson).
26 For further discussion of the Roe and Smith proposals, see discussion infra Part l.B.
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bankruptcy, explaining how inadequate representation for future claimants,
at least in part, led to inequitable results. We then present overviews of the
proposed reforms suggested by Professors Roe and Smith. We assert that
the relatively weak incentives driving the representatives of future claim-
ants; incentives that characterize the "state of the art," will predispose bank-
ruptcy settlements against future claimants. To remedy these defects, we
recommend a "percentage-fee" compensation structure for future claimants'
representatives. The representatives, to be chosen by the court, will receive
a percentage of the claims received by future claimants. Greater payment
for future claimants will imply greater compensation for their representa-
tives. Rather than hoping for selfless advocacy on the part of future claim-
ants' representatives, this policy will ensure that the representatives self-
interestedly pursue the goals of future claimants, much like the advocacy af-
forded other creditors.
Part III focuses on the distribution of risk between present and future
claimants. We note that future claimants' compensation has generally been
subject to considerably greater risk than compensation for present claimants
without a corresponding increase in average return; a "tradition" continued
in the FAIR Act, which similarly allocates risk to future claimants. This
situation violates one of bankruptcy's fundamental goals: the "fair distribu-
tion principle." In response, we recommend that some compensation to
present claimants be postponed to facilitate some degree of risk sharing be-
tween present and future claimants. In addition, we suggest that future
claimants receive a risk premium relative to present claimants. Future
claimants should, on average, receive a greater award than present claim-
ants in order to "compensate" them for bearing the risk that future claims
will be unexpectedly high. The size of this premium should be guided by
the certainty equivalence concept prevalent in economics. Certainty
equivalence refers to the additional average payment required by an indi-
vidual to accept a given amount of risk. By paying future claimants the cer-
tainty equivalent amount of that awarded to present claimants, this
procedure ensures that potential claimants, trapped behind a veil of igno-
rance, would not prefer to be either present or future claimants, unlike the
status quo favoring present claimants. We also discuss how this certainty
equivalence premium should depend upon important variables in mass tort
bankruptcies, such as the size of the damage and the level of epidemiologi-
cal uncertainty.
An example is illustrative. A risk-averse potential claimant would pre-
fer a certain award of 15 (as a present claimant) to a fifty-fifty chance of re-
ceiving 10 or 20 (as a future claimant). However, potential claimants may
be indifferent between receiving a certain award of 14 as opposed to receiv-
ing either 10 or 20 with equal probability.27 Thus, the certainty equivalence
27 If claimants had a utility function ofy = ().975, wherey represents utility and x represents a dol-
lar amount, for example, then claimants would be indifferent between a guaranteed payment of 14 or a
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approach suggests that present claimants should receive the certain award of
14 while future claimants get 10 or 20 with equal probability. This ap-
proach assures that present and future claimants are treated equally. Al-
though future claimants receive the greater average award (since .5 * 10 +
.5 * 20 > 14), the higher average award merely compensates future claim-
ants for "holding" a riskier claim.
Part IV proposes additional reforms for the treatment of future claim-
ants with respect to other creditors, such as contract creditors. We recom-
mend that future claimants, due to their inherent overexposure to the risk in
the number of future claimants and their inability to diversify, bear as little
of this future claims risk as possible, a direct contrast to current practice. If
regular insurance is not available or is prohibitively expensive (a likely sce-
nario),28 the future claims risk should be borne, where possible, by non-tort
creditors rather than future claimants. To facilitate the discussion, we de-
velop the notion of "risk priority," which is distinct from the standard no-
tion of priority utilized in bankruptcy. While ordinary priority specifies the
distribution of value to creditors, we focus on the distribution of risk, hold-
ing the value of distributions constant. We recommend that future claim-
ants receive risk priority with respect to other claimants. In essence, this
implies that contract creditors will "insure" the future claimants. This can
be accomplished while maintaining the distribution of value specified by
current bankruptcy priorities. If future claims prove to be high, contract
creditors will receive a small distribution while total payments to tort
claimants are large. If future claims are small, contract creditors will re-
ceive a larger payoff. Because contract creditors are more plausibly risk
neutral with respect to the risk in future claims, this structure allocates risk
more efficiently.
Unlike other reform proposals, most of our recommendations do not
require substantial changes to existing practice or the development of new
financial instruments. We present judges, legislators, trustees, and other
policymakers with recommendations that can be implemented with rela-
tively few statutory or institutional changes.
fifty-fifty chance of obtaining 10 or 20. The certainty equivalent of a fifty-fifty chance of 10 or 20 de-
pends upon the degree of risk aversion of the claimant. If the claimant were even more risk-averse than
the claimant used in this hypothetical, then a number less than 14 would be the certainty equivalent of
the fifty-fifty chance of 10 or 20.
28 If insurance markets are complete, then many of the results presented here are of diminished im-
portance. It is extremely unlikely, however, that insurance markets are perfect and complete. For a dis-
cussion of this issue, see infra Part III.B.5.
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II. FUTURE CLAIMANTS' REPRESENTATION AND MASS TORT
BANKRUPTCIES
Bankruptcy courts have frequently appointed legal representatives to
represent classes of future claimants in mass tort cases.29 These representa-
tives, along with other requirements for reorganizations described in the
Bankruptcy Code, such as the requirement that the reorganization plan sat-
isfy the "best interest of the creditors" test,3" theoretically protect the inter-
ests of future claimants.3 ' As this section discusses, however, these
arrangements are frequently inadequate.
Before explaining why future claimants are inadequately represented,
the goals of bankruptcy with respect to future claimants must be defined.
Scholars emphasize the norm of "fair distribution."32 Fair distribution, as
the name implies, means that similarly situated claimants should receive
similar payouts.33 In the context of mass tort bankruptcies, fair distribution
applies most directly to present and future claimants. Present and future
tort claimants are similarly situated, after adjusting for discounting.34 In the
case of asbestos, for example, present and future claimants will commonly
suffer the same injury as a result of the same type of exposure. Fairness re-
quires that similar claimants receive similar payments. So does the Bank-
ruptcy Code, which awards the same priority levels to all tort claimants and
implies that tort claimants share pro rata with other claimants in the assets
of the bankrupt firm.35 The Manville bankruptcy court noted this explicitly,
stating that the distinction between present and future claimants was merely
"nominal."36
Fair distributions can be facilitated by insisting that payments to pre-
sent claimants be delayed until the size of future claims is determined. This
strategy would ensure that present claimants are not overpaid if future
claims prove to be larger than expected. As noted in the introduction, how-
29 Resnick, supra note 3, at 2063. For an example, see In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. at 757-
59 (holding that future claimants should be appointed a legal guardian).
30 See 11 U.S.C. § I 129(a)(7)(A) (2000) (establishing that no reorganization plan can obtain court
approval unless each class of creditors either has approved a reorganization plan or receives at least as
much under the reorganization plan as the class would have received in liquidation).
31 Resnick, supra note 3, at 2064.
32 See Roe, supra note 5, at 853; Smith, supra note 2, at 378-80 (pursuing a definition of fair distri-
bution).
33 See Smith, supra note 2, at 372.
34 For simplicity, we will generally assume that the discount rate is zero. In practice, all our results
should be adjusted appropriately for discounting.
35 See DOUGLAS BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 74, 83 (3d ed. 2001) (explaining that "if
two classes contain claims or interests of identical priority ... a plan cannot provide less to one class on
a pro rata basis unless that class consents" and further explaining that "a tort creditor occupies the same
position [in bankruptcy] as a contract creditor"). See also 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V) (2000) (re-
quiring that a trust fund "provide reasonable assurance the trust will value, and be in a financial position
to pay, present claims and future demands that involve similar claims in substantially the same manner).
36 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 628 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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ever, this outcome is undesirable because it denies funds to present claim-
ants at a time when they may have severe demands for money, particularly
to pay pressing medical expenses.3" Thus, bankruptcy courts and policy-
makers must weigh the costs of achieving a fair distribution with many
other goals. The next section examines how these questions were treated in
the bankruptcy of the Johns-Manville Corporation.
A. Future Claimants 'Representation and the Manville Bankruptcy
1. A Brief Overview of the Manville Bankruptcy.-The Johns-
Manville Corporation filed for bankruptcy on August 26, 1982.38 The case
has attracted considerable attention because Manville was solvent at the
time of filing but filed for bankruptcy because it faced overwhelming future
tort liabilities stemming from its production of asbestos.39 Considerable
litigation ensued over the legitimacy and "good faith" of Manville's decla-
ration of bankruptcy,4" particularly because the status of future tort claims
within bankruptcy law was undefined at that time.4" The Manville decision
helped resolve many of these issues. Manville's bankruptcy declaration
while facing future insolvency from massive tort obligations was deter-
mined to be in "good faith. 42 Moreover, future tort claims were treated and
discharged within the Manville bankruptcy reorganization. Indeed, the
bankruptcy judge presiding over the reorganization asserted that the differ-
ence in legal rights between present and future claimants was minimal.43
The Manville bankruptcy court appointed an independent legal repre-
sentative to protect the interests of future claimants (hereinafter referred to
as the "FCR," for future claimants' representative)." The court recognized
that future claimants' interests would otherwise be neglected, as all other
37 See, e.g., Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1987) (dis-
cussing the emergency treatment needs of present claimants injured by the Dalkon Shield).
38 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 729 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
39 See, e.g., id. at 730; Delaney, supra note 22, at 70-81.
40 See In re Johns-Manville, 36 B.R. at 729.
41 For discussions, see Anne Hardiman, Toxic Torts and Chapter 11 Reorganization: The Problem
of Future Claims, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1369 (1985); Frank R. Kennedy, Creative Bankruptcy? Use and
Abuse of the Bankruptcy Law-Reflection on Some Recent Cases, 71 IOWA L. REV. 199 (1985); Steven
Parent, Comment, Judicial Creativity in Dealing with Mass Torts in Bankruptcy, 13 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 381 (1990).
42 See In re Johns-Manville, 36 B.R. at 737.
43 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 628 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
44 While the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly authorize the appointment of a future claimants'
representative, the Court viewed the appointment of an FCR as a necessary condition for an equitable
solution. See In re Johns-Manville, 36 B.R. at 757-59. Subsequently, Congress expressly authorized
the use of a legal representative in the creation of asbestos-related mass tort bankruptcy trust funds. See
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i) (2000).
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representatives' interests conflicted with those of future claimants. 45  For
example, the court dismissed the notion that representatives of Manville's
shareholders would protect the interests of future claimants, stating that
they offered a "skewed and less than robust advocacy" of future claimants'
interests.46
The Manville Chapter 11 reorganization created a trust for all pending
and potential asbestos claims. 47 This trust was (supposedly) amply funded
with approximately $5 billion in assets contributed by Manville and its in-
surance companies. 4' The fund's assets were a combination of cash, pay-
ments from future Manville profits, and up to 80% of Manville's common
stock.49 This fund was intended to compensate in full all claimants, present
and future.51 Indeed, the supervising bankruptcy court believed that the re-
organization plan treated present and future claimants equally, stating that
"a distinction between 'present' and 'future' victims is, at best, nominal.
The Trust does not make this nominal distinction and is designed to satisfy
the claims of all victims, whenever their disease manifests."5
In spite of these laudable intentions, future events proved the distinc-
tion between present and future claimants to be anything but nominal. The
number of claims on the trust fund greatly exceeded expectations. 2 Be-
cause present claimants were paid 100% of their claims, the fund was rap-
idly depleted.5 ' By 1990, less than two years after the trust commenced
operation, the trust fund required reorganization after becoming subject to a
class action lawsuit by potential claimants concerned about the depletion of
the trust.5 4 The settlement that resolved this suit in 1995 specified that late-
arriving tort claimants were to receive only 10% of their claims' nominal
value.55 It is difficult to conceive of a more "unfair" distribution of pay-
ments between present and future claimants.
Future claimants also fared poorly compared to other Manville credi-
tors. Manville's unsecured creditors, who shared priority with future
45 See In re Johns-Manville, 36 B.R. at 749 n.3 (discussing how future claimants' interests would
not be protected by the representatives of equity or current claimants).
46 Id.
47 Indeed, the trust enabled the discharge of all obligations to asbestos claimants. See Asbestos
Litig., at 733 (stating that "the legal obligations of both Johns-Manville and Manville to those injured by
their asbestos-containing products were assumed by the Trust").
48 Id. at 752-53.
49 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
'o Id. at 628.
51 Id.
52 See Asbestos Litig., at 752-62.
53 MANVILLE PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT TRUST, HISTORY, available at
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claimants, received 100% of the value of their claims-a far greater per-
centage than that received by the future claimants. 6 Moreover, Manville
equityholders also obtained some value from the reorganization plan. Be-
cause future claimants had a higher priority than Manville shareholders, a
reorganization plan that satisfied the absolute priority rule would have re-
quired that future claimants be paid in full before Manville equityholders
received any distributions. Instead, shareholders received a distribution
while some future claimants recouped only 10% of their claims-a stark
departure from the norm of priority. Clearly, the Manville reorganization
failed dismally in its attempt to assure a fair distribution for future claim-
ants.
2. Lessons from the Manville Bankruptcy.-What caused this ine-
quality in distribution between future claimants and other creditors? The
inequities are particularly striking when future claimants are compared to
present claimants. Present claimants and future claimants suffered similar
injuries. Manville's reorganization plan supposedly treated them equiva-
lently. And yet future claimants recouped a much smaller proportion of
their claim than present claimants.
The simplest answer to this puzzle is that future claimants were the
victims of extraordinarily bad luck. Had future claims equaled "expecta-
tions," the Manville trust would have been adequate to satisfy all claims in
full. 7 Instead, the number and size of future claimants greatly exceeded
expectations. Through the beginning of 1996, for example, the Manville
trust received approximately three times as many claims as expected. 8 Be-
cause future claims so greatly exceeded expectations, the fund was rapidly
depleted and future claimants, the last to "eat" from the Manville "trough,"
suffered accordingly. Future claimants were thus unlucky. Each future
claimant had to share a fixed-size trust fund with an unexpectedly large
number of claimants, meaning that the amount of recovery per claimant was
unexpectedly low.
While the "victims of bad luck" explanation has the appeal of simplic-
ity, it is at best only partially correct. True, the size of future claims ex-
ceeded expectations, but the imprecision of estimates on future claims
suggests that this possibility should have been realized. For example, in
1984 estimates of total asbestos liability ranged from $8 billion to $87 bil-
lion.58 Thus, future claimants went unprotected from an obvious danger and
bore all the risk of unexpectedly high claims, while present claimants and
other creditors were compensated in full. Although future claimants bore
all of the "downside risk," there is no indication that they would have re-
56 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 633-34 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
57 This was clearly the view taken by the Manville bankruptcy judge. See id. at 628 (expecting
minimal differences between present and future claimants' compensation).
58 MANVILLE SETTLEMENT HISTORY, supra note 53.
59 Roe, supra note 5, at 872 n.73 (citations omitted).
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ceived disproportionate benefits if future claims fell short of expectations.6 °
For example, in the mass tort bankruptcy of the A.H. Robins Corporation
(stemming from liabilities associated with the Dalkon Shield intrauterine
device), excess funds were shared equally between present and future
claimants when future claims fell short of expectations.61 Thus, future
claimants of A.H. Robins and Manville bore downside risk but did not en-
joy the corresponding upside; the future claimants were gambling but they
could only lose.62 This outcome suggests a systematic bias against future
claimants that cannot be attributed to bad luck.
On the other hand, subsequent mass tort bankruptcies have done a bet-
ter job of estimating future claims-which suggests that an unexpectedly
large number of future claims in the Manville bankruptcy was at least par-
tially to blame. For example, the A.H. Robins bankruptcy provided a trust
fund for future claimants that did not prove to be under-funded.63 Neverthe-
less, even the A.H. Robins bankruptcy outcome penalized future claimants
in some respects. As noted above, the A.H. Robins bankruptcy suffered
from an unfair risk distribution to future claimants; future claimants would
have suffered financially if claims had proved higher than expected, yet
they did not benefit financially when the number of claimants turned out to
be less than expected.' 4 In addition, a bar date for tort claims could have
left future claimants "who exhibited no symptoms prior to the bar date but
who later manifested Dalkon-Shield related injuries ... with no means of
recovery... because of their failure to file timely proofs of claim."65 These
features suggest that the favorable outcome of the A.H. Robins bankruptcy
was at least partially related to an unexpectedly low number of future
60 While the Manville bankruptcy settlement allowed future claimants to receive small awards when
future claims exceeded expectations, there is no indication that future claimants would have been al-
lowed to receive more than present claimants if future claims had fallen short of expectations. See, e.g.,
In re Johns-Manville, 68 B.R. at 628 (overlooking the possibility that future claimants should receive
more than 100% of their claims in some states of the world if they are to receive the same average com-
pensation as present claimants).
61 See In re A.H. Robins Co., 86 F.3d 364, 367 (3d Cir. 1996) (specifying an equal sharing of the
funds remaining in the Dalkon Shield Trust).
62 This type of risk allocation is unfair to future claimants, whether they are risk-neutral or risk-
averse. In Part Il, we discuss distributions that may be fair to risk-neutral future claimants but are un-
fair to risk-averse claimants.
63 See GIBSON, supra note 17, at 199 (discussing the A.H. Robins' trust fund's performance); see
also Georgene M. Vairo, Georgine, the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, and the Rhetoric of Mass Tort
Claims Resolution, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 79, 154 (1997). Note, however, that this success was attained
because many claimants chose to accept a relatively small sum rather than litigate for the full value of
their tort claims. See GIBSON, supra note 17, at 199-200. This observation suggests that the settlement
may not have been as beneficial for future claimants as it appeared.
64 For a discussion of the risk allocation to future claimants in the A.H. Robins bankruptcy, see
Parts II and III.
65 GIBSON, supra note 17, at 215.
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claims,66 and that bankruptcy practice has not yet solved the problem of fu-
ture claimants.
This conclusion is bolstered by the outlines of the FAIR Act, Con-
gress's attempt to resolve the asbestos litigation crisis.67 Whatever the
FAIR Act's merits, it establishes a fixed fund for payments to claimants, a
fixed payment per claimant, and discharges all future liabilities. If future
claims exceed expectations, future claimants will suffer as the fund be-
comes depleted,68 but the fixed payment per injury ensures that future
claimants receive no compensation for bearing this risk.
3. Incentives for Future Claimants' Representatives in the Manville
Bankruptcy.-Some observers have suggested that inadequate rep-
resentation doomed Manville's future claimants.69 They note that the FCR
acted as a "shuttle diplomat" mediating between the various parties, rather
than a zealous advocate for his nominal clients.7" For example, present
claimants suspected the FCR of unduly favoring equity-a surprising con-
cern in light of the FCR's duties on behalf of future claimants.7
It is unlikely that the Manville FCR was not functioning in good faith.
Instead, the FCR's peculiar role in the reorganization negotiations high-
lights some of the weaknesses of FCRs in general as protectors of future
claimants' interests. Several factors undermine the FCR's ability to match
the advocacy of other representatives in bankruptcy negotiations. The
FCR's clients are unidentified and unknown. As such, future claimants
cannot monitor the FCR's performance in the negotiations.72 Other parties
in interest to a bankruptcy reorganization (such as present claimants or un-
secured debtholders), by contrast, may be actively involved in the negotia-
tions and insist on certain features in any reorganization plan.73 These
pressures tilt the negotiations in favor of the more actively involved parties.
66 In addition, Dalkon-Shield-related injuries may not have had a latency period as long as those
caused by asbestos, making estimation of future claims an easier process.
67 FAIR Act, supra note 6.
68 See, e.g., Hearings on Asbestos Litigation, supra note 14, at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
print testimony.cfm?id=777&witid=2180 (testimony of Dr. Mark A. Peterson, describing the possibil-
ity that future claims will exceed expectations, leaving the trust fund depleted for late arriving claim-
ants).
69 See Smith, supra note 2, at 390-91.
70 Id. at 390.
71 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 66 B.R. 517, 529 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1986); Smith, supra note 2, at
390.
72 See Smith, supra note 2, at 390.
73 In bankruptcy, the United States Trustee appoints committees to represent the various classes of
creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (2000) (noting who shall serve on the committees). These com-
mittees often retain professionals (who must receive court approval) to represent their interests in the
negotiations. See Resnick, supra note 3, at 2062. The committees can actively monitor their appointed
representatives and insist that these representatives demand certain features from any settlement plan.
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When negotiations become difficult, it is easier for the FCR, with no direct
monitoring and accountability, to "bend" in order to clinch a deal.
The FCR's motivation also differs from that of other representatives.
Creditors' committees, for example, may be represented by large law firms
with a vested interest in obtaining a favorable settlement. These law firms
command hefty fees and know that future opportunities depend upon their
success in negotiations. As a result, they have a strong financial incentive
to pursue their clients' interests. Present claimants' representatives also
typically have a strong financial interest in a favorable settlement for their
clients. For example, in the Manville case, the Bankruptcy Court noted that
members of the present claimants' committee received a percentage of the
total receipt of present claimants through contingency fee arrangements."4
The FCR, by contrast, has little or no financial interest in the success of fu-
ture claimants' claims. For example, one prominent FCR expressly noted
that he was "unbiased and not motivated by a contingent fee arrangement or
duty to maximize shareholder value." 5 The future claimants' representative
also claimed that he aimed "not only to provide for ... asbestos claimants,
but to provide employment and livelihood for current and future workers
and value for shareholders." 6 While these characteristics make FCRs ad-
mirable mediators in bankruptcy, the contrast in incentives between FCRs
and the representatives of other present claimants and creditors ensures that
future claimants are represented less aggressively in bankruptcy negotia-
tions.
While the FCR's advocacy on behalf of future claimants may be com-
paratively weak, the need for effective representation in the area is keen. In
a relevant article, Professor Thomas Smith describes two primary factors
that exacerbate ineffective representation to result in small recoveries for
future claimants.77 First, Smith claims that the "vividness effect" plays an
important role in reducing the funds set aside for future claimants." The
vividness effect arises because visible, concrete information receives
greater-than-warranted emphasis in decision making, as compared to more
abstract information.79 In the Manville bankruptcy, for example, negotiators
observed present claimants suffering from asbestosis. While the existence
of future claimants was a statistical certainty, the identity of these claimants
was unknown. However, any payments reserved for future claimants de-
74 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 749 n.3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
75 See, e.g., Hearings on Asbestos Litigation, supra note 14, at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
print testimony.cfm?id=777&witid=2180 (testimony of Professor Eric Green).
76 Id.
77 See Smith, supra note 2, at 382-90.
78 Id. at 383.
79 Smith cites several studies on the "vividness effect." Id. at 383 n.60. These studies include
Richard E. Nisbett & Eugene Borgida, Attribution and the Psychology of Prediction, 32 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 932 (1975); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heu-
ristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
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tracted, in part, from the funds available for needy present claimants. Simi-
larly, the FAIR Act hearings included several references by Senators to pre-
sent claimants from Libby, Montana."0 These vivid examples were
powerful enough to induce the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, Senator Orrin Hatch, to specifically address the compensation for these
present claimants.8" If the FAIR Act trust fund is not increased, the
compensation for present claimants from Libby must come from the
pockets of future claimants. The vividness effect thus helped induce FAIR
Act negotiators to overcompensate the vivid present claimants relative to
the ill-defined future claimants.
Second, Smith observes that future claims in the Manville bankruptcy
were not merely abstract, but also highly uncertain.82 Moreover, the epide-
miological methodology for estimating the size of future claims in the Man-
ville case was both exceedingly complex and subject to considerable debate
amongst representatives for the various creditors and claimants commit-
tees.83 There was not one obviously "correct" methodology. Instead, there
was a dispute about the appropriate methodology, with legal representatives
advocating the selection of the estimate that was most favorable to their
cause. Thus, epidemiology alone cannot determine the estimate of future
claims. Instead, the representatives of the creditors and claimants negotiate
about which epidemiological estimate to employ, attempting to convince
the bankruptcy judge that "their" estimate is the correct one.84 Recall that
80 See, e.g., Hearings on Asbestos Litigation, supra note 14, at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
print testimony.cftm?id=777&witid=2181 (testimony of Senator Patty Murray); see also id. at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/print testimony.cfm?id=777&witid=2183 (testimony of Senator Max Bau-
cus).
81 Id. at http://judiciary.senate.gov/print-testimony.cfm?id=777&wit-id=2189 (testimony of Orrin
Hatch). See also Ted Monoson, Senate Vows Not to Forget Libby, BILLINGS GAZETTE, June 5, 2003,
available at http://www.montanaforum.com/rednews/2003/06/05/build/libby/senators-forget.php?
nnn=2.
82 See Smith, supra note 2, at 384.
83 Id. The size of future claims will be a random variable. Random variables, such as the value of a
rolled die, are subject to uncertainty. The size of future claims, however, is subject to a degree of uncer-
tainty that is even greater than that of a rolled die. With a rolled die, for example, the distribution of the
random variable is defined. Thus, the statistician can quantify the minimum (1), maximum (6), and ex-
pected values (3.5). The statistician can even quantify the degree of uncertainty in the rolled die random
variable by calculating the variance. By contrast, the epidemiological uncertainties involved in estimat-
ing the size of future claims ensure that no such quantification of the distribution of future claims is pos-
sible. The minimum, maximum, and mean value of future claims are all subject to uncertainty
themselves, as is the variance. Thus, the size of future claims is not merely uncertain. In addition, there
is uncertainty about the degree of uncertainty in future claims (i.e., there is no agreed-upon method of
estimating the variance). While it is difficult to classify the distribution of many "real-world" random
variables, the problem is particularly acute with future claims, which are frequently relatively unique
occurrences. For example, the ultimate distribution of asbestosis may yield little insight for estimating
the distribution of injuries as a result of intrauterine device implants.
84 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1) (2000) authorizes a bankruptcy judge to produce an estimate of contingent
claims, such as the value of future tort claims.
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epidemiological estimates of total asbestos damage in 1984 differed by a
factor of ten.85 Similarly, in 2001, eight forecasts of the number of future
claims on the Manville Trust varied by a factor of four.86 Thus, effective
representation interacts with epidemiology in predicting the size of future
claims, and consequently, the size of the fund necessary to compensate fu-
ture claimants.
Together, the "vividness effect" and the uncertainty in the size of fu-
ture claims amplify the impact of ineffective representation for future
claimants. The vividness effect predisposes settlement plans in favor of
present claimants. The epidemiological uncertainties associated with esti-
mating the size of future claims ensure that effective representation is criti-
cal, as advocacy plays a critical role in determining the "expected" size of
future claims.
In light of this discussion, the disparate outcomes of the Manville
bankruptcy (eerily echoed in the negotiations leading to the FAIR Act) be-
come less surprising. Weak incentives, the vividness effect, and epidemiol-
ogical uncertainties help undermine the ability of FCRs to protect the
interests of future claimants. The combined effect of these factors, along
with total future claims that were on the high end of early estimates, pre-
vented future claimants from recouping more than a small percentage of
their claims. The Manville saga illustrates how any "solution" to the prob-
lem of future claimants must overcome future claimants' representation
problems foremost.87
B. Overcoming the Representation Problem: The Roe and Smith
Proposals
FCRs are currently widely used to protect the interests of future claim-
ants. Indeed, Congress has mandated the use of FCRs in the formation of
asbestos related mass tort bankruptcy trusts.88 Similarly, the National Bank-
ruptcy Review Commission ("NBRC"), a congressionally established insti-
tution, recommended that the Bankruptcy Code be amended to explicitly
authorize court-appointed representatives for future claimants whenever
necessary.89 The NBRC stated that the appointment of a future claimants'
representative was "an absolute necessity and a fundamental prerequisite to
85 See Roe, supra note 5, at 872 n.73 (internal citations omitted).
86 See, e.g., Hearings on Asbestos Litigation, supra note 14, at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
print testimony.cfm?id=777&wit id=2189 (testimony of Dr. Mark Peterson).
87 Deficiencies in the representation of future claimants would be inconsequential if judges could
ensure that future claimants are fairly treated. However, impartial judges with limited resources and no
direct stake in the negotiations are unlikely candidates to perfectly protect future claimants.
88 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i) (2000).
89 NBRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 316; see also THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE,
REFORMING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE'S CODE REVIEW
PROJECT FINAL REPORT 37-38 (1997) (recommending statutory changes, authorizing bankruptcy courts
to appoint legal representatives for future claimants).
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the discharge of mass future claims."9 Reflecting these views, some schol-
ars have gone further, suggesting that the bankruptcy court be required to
appoint an FCR in every bankruptcy case involving future mass tort liabil-
ity.9' The NBRC recommended that FCRs receive broad powers, stating
that
the bankruptcy code should provide that a mass future claims representative
shall have the exclusive power to file a claim or claims on behalf of the class
of mass future claims (and determine whether or not to file a claim), to cast
votes on behalf of the holders of mass future claims.92
The widespread, standardized use of FCRs appears reasonable, as they
offer some protection of future claimants' interest. Nevertheless, the Man-
ville bankruptcy's outcome provides a sobering reminder that FCRs are im-
perfect advocates for future claimants' interests. Their ability and incentive
to protect future claimants are inadequate relative to the other parties in
bankruptcy negotiations. Any solution to the "fair distribution problem"
must overcome these inadequacies, either by mitigating their consequences
or by eliminating their causes.
Professors Mark Roe and Thomas Smith each propose improvements
to current practice.93 Both proposals aim at mitigation rather than elimina-
tion of future claimants' representation problems. That is, both proposals
seek to minimize the consequences of FCRs' imperfect incentives rather
than attempting to improve or restructure them.
1. Roe 's Variable Annuity Approach.-Professor Roe's proposal al-
ters the conventional practice regarding the timing of compensation to pre-
sent claimants. Standard tort practice specifies that injured parties receive
damages in one lump sum.94 Once a claim is established, the tortfeasor pays
the entire award to the victim. With respect to mass tort bankruptcies in-
volving uncertain future claims, however, Roe argues for periodic rather
than lump sum awards.95 Roe analogizes his proposal for periodic payments
90 NBRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 332.
91 See Resnick, supra note 3, at 2078; NBRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 332. But see Jeffrey Davis,
Cramming down Future Claims in Bankruptcy: Fairness, Bankruptcy Policy, Due Process, and the Les-
sons of the Piper Reorganization, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 329 (1995) (suggesting that the appointment of
future claimants' representatives will be unnecessarily expensive in some contexts).
92 NBRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 316-17.
93 See Roe, supra note 5; Smith, supra note 2. The Roe and Smith proposals also have important
consequences for the distribution of risk between present claimants, future claimants, and other credi-
tors. These aspects of the proposals will be discussed in detail below in Part lII.B.3 and III.B.4.
94 In the Manville case, for example, claimants were compensated in full from the trust fund as their
claims became established in a "First-In, First-Out" fashion. MANVILLE SETTLEMENT HISTORY, supra
note 53. See generally Samuel A. Rea, Lump-Sum Versus Periodic Damage Awards, 10 J. LEGAL STUD.
131 (1981) (comparing the costs and benefits of lump-sum damage awards with respect to periodic
damage payments).
95 See Roe, supra note 5, at 870-74.
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to a variable annuity. The size of the annual payments to tort victims will
depend upon the funds available for payment and the expected and actual
number of claimants. As time passes, the value of the annual payment will
be adjusted. If the value of the assets in the fund rises or the number of fu-
ture claimants proves smaller than expected, then the value of the annual
payments to claimants will rise. If the assets fall in value or future claims
prove unexpectedly numerous, by contrast, then the annual sum should fall.
Roe's proposal mitigates the effects of imperfect representation for fu-
ture claimants. If psychological and institutional factors bias estimates of
future claims downward, the Roe approach ensures that the consequences of
decisions taken on the basis of these estimates will be smaller. Should the
estimates of future claims developed during the bankruptcy process prove
unreasonably low, the variable annuity approach ensures that an excessive
amount of funds would not be awarded at an early stage, leaving little, if
any, funds remaining for future claimants. Instead, funds are disbursed
gradually, leaving more in reserve to protect against unexpectedly high fu-
ture claims. This approach partially protects future claimants from the con-
sequences of ineffective representation.
While Roe's proposal mitigates the consequences of the representation
problem, it does not offer a comprehensive solution.96 Under Roe's pro-
posal, all of the aforementioned deficiencies associated with the representa-
tion of future claimants remain the same. Thus, it is quite likely that the
size of the annuity received by present claimants will be greater than the
annuity received by late arriving claimants-a reprise of the problem that
the proposal is designed to prevent (albeit on a smaller scale). In addition, a
longer delay in the distribution of awards to present claimants necessarily
makes liquidity less available to those present claimants who benefit most
from immediate compensation for their injury. Furthermore, the annuity's
effectiveness depends critically on the ability to accurately adjust annuity
payments to account for new information about the size of future claims.
These readjustment decisions, however, will offer numerous opportunities
for present claimants to exploit their representational advantages. Finally, it
will be considerably more expensive to operate a variable annuity fund and
remain in contact with all claimants than to simply award lump sum pay-
ments. If the trust fund must engage in litigation each time the size of the
annual payment is readjusted, for example, then the potential benefits of the
annuity approach may be dwarfed by its costs. These factors may explain
why the variable annuity approach, first proposed in 1984, has yet to be im-
plemented.
2. Smith's Capital Markets Approach. -Professor Thomas Smith's
"capital markets approach" also attempts to mitigate the damage caused by
96 See the critique of Roe's proposal in Smith, supra note 2, at 392-93.
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ineffective representation of future claimants.97 Rather than requiring trus-
tees to estimate the size of future claims (as in the variable annuity ap-
proach), Smith allows the "capital markets" to conduct the estimation
procedure. Because the capital markets are presumably not subject to the
biases that plague bankruptcy reorganizations, Smith asserts that the capital
markets approach will protect future claimants, even if they are ineffec-
tively represented.
Smith's capital markets approach begins with the creation of a new fi-
nancial instrument.98 The financial instrument, backed by some of the as-
sets of the insolvent firm, matures in a distant period (after all future claims
have been realized).99 Each tort claimant receives one share of the instru-
ment for each dollar in claims."° Thus, the instrument has a variable num-
ber of shares, with the ultimate number of shares equaling the aggregate
dollar value of claims. When the instrument matures, each shareholder will
share value pro rata with the other shareholders in the fund." '
For example, suppose that an insolvent firm declares bankruptcy be-
cause it faces massive present and future tort liabilities." 2 Assume, for sim-
plicity, that the bankrupt firm has no contract creditors. In this case, the
entire value of the firm ultimately will be paid to tort claimants. Suppose
further that the size of future tort claims will be resolved within ten years.
The firm's assets, worth $1 billion, become the backing for a financial in-
strument (hereinafter the "tort instrument") that yields nothing until it ma-
tures in ten years, at which point the instrument disburses its entire value to
its shareholders in a pro rata fashion. 3 If the claims of present claimants
are worth $500 million, then present claimants will be issued 500 million
shares in the tort instrument. As future claimants realize their claims, more
shares will be issued. Suppose that in year five, $400 million in claims are
realized, in year six, $600 million claims are realized, while in all other
years no claims are established. Four-hundred million shares in the tort in-
strument would thus be issued in year five and a further 600 million in year
six. At the time of maturity, a total of 1.5 billion shares (500 million + 400
million + 600 million) would have been issued. When the fund disburses
its assets, each shareholder will thus receive $0.667 per share since 1.5 bil-
lion shares have been issued while the fund has $1 billion in assets ($0.667
per share = $1 billion/1.5 billion shares)."° Note that each tort claimant's
97 Id. at 394-401.
98 Id. at 395-96.
99 Id. at 396.
100 Id. at 397.
101 Id.
102 This example follows those in Smith. Id. at 394-401.
103 For simplicity, we will assume that the discount and interest rates are zero. Thus, all figures are
in present (as well as future) values.
104 Recall that the interest rate is zero.
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shares have the same value at maturity--early claimants' shares do not have
extra value.
Smith's capital markets approach ameliorates the fair distribution prob-
lem by withholding disbursements until the value of aggregate claims is
known with certainty. As mentioned earlier, however, early claimants may
have demands for money that do not allow them to wait for late arriving
compensation. Smith proposes to solve this problem by allowing the shares
in the tort instrument to be sold. Early claimants could sell their shares on
the capital markets, allowing them to obtain needed funds before the tort in-
strument matures. Smith believes that the market price of these shares
would be a fair one. Market participants would have a strong financial in-
centive not to underestimate the size of future claims because underestima-
tion would induce the market participants to overpay for the shares. Thus,
the capital markets approach minimizes the impact of ineffective represen-
tation on future claimants by ensuring that the capital markets, rather than
bankruptcy negotiators, allocate compensation between present and future
payments.
The capital markets approach requires the creation of a "somewhat ex-
otic" new financial instrument as well as markets that trade the instru-
ment.' O5 As a result, Smith's creative and insightful approach raises a
number of concerns. For example, Smith notes that trading in trust shares
would probably be limited to institutions." 6 It is quite possible that individ-
ual tort claimants may only be able to sell their shares at a substantial dis-
count in a thinly traded market that is dominated by a few large institutional
buyers.0 7 Thus, the capital markets approach is at best only a partial solu-
tion to the fair distribution problem-it will only apply to very large scale
mass tort bankruptcies as it is extremely unlikely that a market will develop
for smaller tort instruments.0 8 If the capital markets approach is tried but a
market fails to develop, then early claimants will be faced with the unpalat-
able choice of waiting until the bond matures or selling the bond at a "fire-
sale" price in a thin market. To avoid this outcome, bankruptcy negotiators
and trustees will be required to determine whether or not the capital markets
approach should be tried in a given case. Because the capital markets ap-
105 Smith, supra note 2, at 406.
106 Id.
107 While Smith compares trading in tort instruments to trading in cotton futures, the analogy is im-
perfect. Id. Commodities markets, like cotton, involve a large number of producers and consumers.
See, e.g., Bolin Farms v. Am. Cotton Shippers Ass'n, 370 F. Supp. 1353 (W.D. La. 1974) (describing a
dispute in cotton futures markets between a large number of farmers and producers from the early
1970s). As a result, these futures markets are far more liquid than the market for tort instruments is
likely to be.
108 An institution trading a given instrument must pay a fixed cost to acquire some familiarity with
that instrument. If a market is very small, it is unlikely that an institution will be willing to bear the
fixed cost to enter the market. Without familiarity with the instrument, an institution is likely to pur-
chase the instrument only if it appears spectacularly cheap.
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proach does not improve the incentives of FCRs, this leaves open the possi-
bility that well-represented present claimants will be able to influence the
choice of compensation plan and/or tort instrument in their favor. Finally,
Smith's approach may be dramatically unfair to future claimants from a
risk-bearing perspective, as discussed below in Part III.B.2.
Both Roe and Smith offer attractive proposals that represent substantial
improvements over current methods for solving the fair distribution prob-
lem. Neither proposal, however, attempts directly to improve the quality of
representation for future claimants. Instead, they strive to minimize the
consequences of inadequate representation. Because the Roe and Smith
proposals require institutional innovations that will inevitably entail some
negotiation, it is quite possible that the failure of their proposals to address
the representation problem directly may undermine the proposals' ultimate
effectiveness. Without effective representation for future claimants, present
claimants and other creditors will have ample opportunity to gain an advan-
tage over future claimants in the negotiations that will inevitably precede
the variable annuity or capital markets approaches.
C. Solving the Representation Problem
1. The Percentage-Fee Compensation Setup.-FCRs are widely rec-
ognized as essential protectors of the rights of future claimants in bank-
ruptcy negotiations. Indeed, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
suggests that due process for future claimants may be violated if their
claims are discharged in bankruptcy without the appointment of a FCR. °9
As the previous sections demonstrated, however, FCRs are imperfect advo-
cates for the rights of future claimants. Moreover, as we have seen, even
elaborate attempts to minimize the future claimants' representation problem
are at best incomplete. Given the amount of confidence placed in the FCR
by policymakers, a better mechanism for the protection of future claimants
is essential. A truly comprehensive solution must address the representa-
tion problem directly; it must ensure that the FCR behaves as if she were
being monitored and compensated by future claimants. Since future claim-
ants are unknown, this seems like an unattainable goal. A simple change in
the compensation structure of FCRs, however, would directly align the
goals of the FCR and the future claimants, protecting future claimants from
many of the dangers identified above.
To ensure that future claimants are equitably represented in bank-
ruptcy, we recommend that FCRs receive a percentage of the funds received
by future claimants. The outlines of our recommendation are simple: Sup-
pose, for example, that all claimants defined as "future claimants" of a firm
within mass tort bankruptcy receive $1 billion over a twenty-year period
and that the percentage fee determined by the bankruptcy court is 1%. This
109 See NBRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 331-32.
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would imply that the FCR would receive $10 million ($1 billion * .01) in
fees over the twenty-year period."' Because FCRs will share directly in the
funds that are ultimately received by future claimants, they will have a
strong incentive to maximize the payments received by future claimants-a
better outcome for future claimants will result in greater compensation for
their representatives."' In our example, if future claimants ultimately re-
ceive $1.5 billion rather than $1 billion, then the FCR receives $15 million
rather than $10 million, a substantial increase. Alternatively, if future
claimants obtain $500 million, the FCR receives "only" $5 million. Thus,
the FCR will self-interestedly seek to maximize the funds received by fu-
ture claimants. At present, by contrast, the FCR receives an hourly fee or
some other non-incentivizing compensation." 2 As a result, the FCR has no
direct financial stake in the outcome for future claimants. Given the biases
against future claimants that characterize many mass tort bankruptcies, this
state of affairs leads to unfair distributions to future claimants.
2. Advantages of the Percentage-Fee Compensation Scheme.-
Awarding the FCR a percentage of the future claimants' receipts will
ameliorate the two major representational deficiencies identified above.
First, the FCR will be less susceptible to the vividness effect. Recall that
the vividness effect leads individuals to overemphasize immediate, concrete
needs as compared to abstract needs far in the future. When the FCR is
awarded an hourly fee, she will be as susceptible to the psychological biases
of the vividness effect as any other individual. As a result, she may agree to
reorganization plans that unduly favor concrete, present claimants relative
to unknown future claimants. An FCR receiving a percentage of the future
claimants' receipts will be less prone to the vividness effect, however. If
the FCR succumbs to the vividness effect, she suffers a financial loss. As a
result, the FCR will be vigilant about the vividness effect and will tend to
emphasize statistical data to a greater degree than other bankruptcy negotia-
tion participants. Furthermore, she will exert a corrective influence on
other parties to the negotiations, such as the judge who must approve the
settlement, thereby ensuring that the vividness effect does not dominate the
110 Again, assume for simplicity that the discount and interest rates are zero.
I In this section, we will assume that future claimants' interests are defined entirely by the "more
is better" principle (i.e., that future claimants care only about the average amount of funds they will re-
ceive). While the "more is better" principle would presumably be a feature of the future claimants'
goals, it is unlikely to be future claimants' sole interest. For example, future claimants might prefer
slightly smaller average payments if the payments were less risky. Similarly, future claimants might
prefer smaller average payments if the payments were distributed more equitably. These issues will be
discussed in detail in Part 111.
112 See Smith, supra note 2, at 385 (noting that FCRs "are not compensated by a percentage of the
debtor's assets that they secure for their clients"); Hearings on Asbestos Litigation, supra note 14, at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/print-testimony.cfm?id=777&witid=2180 (testimony of Professor Eric
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reorganization plan. Second, an FCR compensated based upon a percentage
fee will help ensure that the choice of epidemiological estimation proce-
dures is not overly influenced by the present claimants. Because the choice
of epidemiological estimation procedures is so crucial to the reorganization
plan, the FCR's ability to advocate estimates that are more favorable to fu-
ture claimants will be an important part of her role.
A percentage stake for FCRs also reduces the pernicious effects of fu-
ture claimants' monitoring deficiencies. Future claimants will remain un-
able to express their wishes directly to their representatives. If the FCR
"internalizes" the future claimants' goals because she shares their payoff,
however, there is less need for the future claimants to monitor their repre-
sentative. Under this approach, the future claimants' interests will be pro-
tected because their representative shares the same interests. Furthermore,
the harmful effects of future claimants' inability to compensate their repre-
sentatives directly will also be mitigated. Generally, direct compensation of
representatives is important because it enables individuals to control their
representatives' behavior."3 Obviously, unknown future claimants cannot
utilize this control lever. However, because the "equity-holding" FCR
shares the future claimants' interests in obtaining awards, future claimants
will have less need for the control that is associated with direct compensa-
tion. ' 4
An FCR with a financial interest in securing funds for future claimants
might also bring benefits to trust funds created by a legislature, such as the
fund constituted under the FAIR Act.' At present, future claimants are at a
disadvantage in legislative bargaining over the parameters of a trust fund.
While companies and present claimants both lobby to ensure that they are
treated more equitably, future claimants' interests are protected by indi-
viduals with no direct financial stake in the outcome of the legislation." 6 A
percentage-compensated FCR would help level the playing field for future
claimants.
3. Implementing the Percentage-Fee Compensation Scheme.-The
preceding section suggests that a percentage-fee compensation scheme for FCRs
has many advantages over other compensation structures. This section addresses
several issues regarding the implementation of the percentage-fee scheme.
113 In general, creditors' committees may retain counsel who are entitled to compensation from the
bankruptcy estate. Because the creditors' committees make the hiring and firing decisions, however,
they can achieve greater control than future claimants, who can not directly retain their counsel.
114 In order to insure that FCRs' incentives remain well aligned with future claimants, FCRs should
not be allowed to take action that would reduce their incentives, such as selling their fees for a lump sum
to a third party.
115 FAIR Act, supra note 6.
116 See, e.g., Hearings on Asbestos Litigation, supra note 14, at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
print testimony.cfmid=777&witid=2180 (testimony of Dr. Green, regarding the interests of future
claimants, but claiming no financial interest in the outcome of the legislation).
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First, a lack of statutory authority should not hinder the adoption of the
percentage-fee scheme. At present, the Bankruptcy Code makes no men-
tion of the appointment of FCRs,"7 and bankruptcy courts derive their au-
thority to appoint FCRs from their equitable powers."' Since percentage-
fee compensation for FCRs will lead to more equitable outcomes for future
claimants (as described above), bankruptcy courts should be willing to
compensate FCRs with a percentage of future claimants' receipts. Further-
more, potential statutory innovations do not preclude the use of percentage
fees. For example, a percentage fee falls within the broad terminology used
in the National Bankruptcy Review Commission's proposed statute author-
izing the appointment of an FCR and describing the FCR's compensation as
an administrative expense." 9 Under Bankruptcy Code § 507(a)(1), this
means that the FCR's fees receive priority over the claims of other unse-
cured creditors and are effectively shared by all unsecured creditors. The
percentage-fee approach, however, may necessitate large fees for FCRs 2°
Unsecured contract creditors and others may understandably object to this
aspect of the percentage-fee approach, claiming that it constitutes a handout
to lawyers. The high fees, however, simply reflect the high stakes for fu-
ture claimants and their desperate need for effective representation. Future
claimants' interests need protection and the percentage-fee approach offers
the best method of ensuring adequate representation. The fair distribution
problem in mass tort bankruptcies cannot be solved cheaply and thus the
cost should be shared amongst all the creditors.
Even if bankruptcy courts prove unwilling to impose the cost of com-
pensating an FCR based on a percentage-fee system on all creditors, this
method of compensation should remain a viable option. Just as sharehold-
ers in a publicly traded company are willing to issue stock options to pro-
vide incentives for executives, so too should future claimants be willing to
share a percentage of their own compensation with an FCR if such an ap-
proach will help future claimants gain a larger slice of the total "pie." In-
deed, future claimants' desire to motivate their agents may be even greater
than ordinary shareholders because future claimants have no other means of
monitoring their agents. This suggests that a percentage-fee system of com-
pensation should be chosen in almost all cases, even if some or all of the
fees must be paid directly by the future claimants themselves.'
117 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i) (2000) constitutes an exception. It relates exclusively to asbestos,
however.
118 See In re Johns-Manville Co., 36 BR. 743, 758 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
119 See NBRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 316 (stating that the FCR's "fees and expenses" constitute
administrative expenses but providing no restrictions on the structure of the fees).
120 The fees will not always be large. Competition between law firms may bring the fees down to a
reasonable level.
121 Even if the future claimants must pay some of the percentage themselves, some of the FCR's
fees should still be counted as administrative expenses. For example, the court may order that the com-
pensation paid directly by future claimants should be reduced by the amount that the court would have
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The FCR should be chosen by the bankruptcy judge."' Because per-
centage-fee compensation may lead to lucrative rewards for FCRs, there
may be competition among potential FCRs for the appointment. The bank-
ruptcy judge should choose the FCR on the basis of two criteria. First, the
FCR should have the skills necessary to obtain a large settlement for the fu-
ture claimants.'23 Obviously, the judge should choose the FCR most likely
to gamer a large fund to compensate the future claimants. Second, the
judge must consider the potential FCR's proposed fee. In doing so, it is
important to recognize that the future claimants' interests (as well as the in-
terests of other claimants) are affected by the size of the FCR's fee. The
FCR's fee is subtracted from the funds available for all unsecured creditors
(or alternatively, directly from the funds available for future claimants). As
a result, future claimants and other creditors benefit if the FCR takes a rela-
tively small percentage. Thus, the judge must consider both the FCR's abil-
ity as well as her fee when appointing the FCR.
III. THE FAIR DISTRIBUTION PROBLEM AND RISK AVERSION BY
FUTURE CLAIMANTS
Up to this point, we have focused our attention on the future claimants'
representation problem. We noted that ill-defined future claimants, unable
to choose, monitor, or compensate their representatives, suffer from a dis-
advantage in bankruptcy with respect to contract creditors and present
claimants. This disadvantage is partially independent of the considerable
uncertainty that surrounds the size of future claims: even if the size of fu-
ture claims were certain, future claimants would be at a disadvantage be-
cause of inadequate representation. The uncertainty in the number of future
claimants exacerbates the representation problem because it allows more
scope for other claimants to take advantage of future claimants. In addition,
the uncertainty in future claims introduces a second prong to the "fair dis-
tribution problem" for future claimants-the allocation of risk. Mass tort
bankruptcy negotiations involving future claims do not simply allocate
funds to present claimants, future claimants, and other creditors; they also
apportion, either implicitly or explicitly, the risk in the size of future claims
to these disparate groups. Because individuals are generally risk-averse,
these risk allocations play an important role in the fair distribution prob-
lem.'24 Truly fair outcomes for future claimants cannot simply assure future
had to pay an FCR compensated on an hourly basis.
122 Judges and trustees currently choose the FCR. For a discussion of the appointment process, see
Resnick, supra note 3, at 2078-79. For the statutory rules governing administration of the bankruptcy
estate, see II U.S.C. §§ 321-331 (2000).
123 Some of the factors to be considered when determining a potential FCR's ability include the size
of previous settlements obtained for future claimants, the potential FCR's mass tort bankruptcy experi-
ence, and the size of settlements obtained in non-bankruptcy-related tort settlements.
124 Risk aversion will be discussed in detail in Part III.A.l.
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claimants the same average award payments as present claimants.' 25 A fair
distribution must also share the risk in the size of future claims evenly, or
fairly compensate those who bear the risk in the size of future claims. The
uncertainty in the number of future claimants introduces an important wrin-
kle to mass tort bankruptcies that does not exist in other bankruptcies.
Not surprisingly, future claimants have "come up short" in the alloca-
tion of the risk in future claims. 126 Moreover, while the representation prob-
lem has been studied extensively, the risk distribution problem has not been
analyzed sufficiently. In this Part, we examine the risk allocation dimen-
sions of the fair distribution problem.
A. Risk Aversion, Certainty Equivalence and the Definition of Fair
Treatment for Future Claimants
1. Risk Aversion.-Economists generally believe that individuals ex-
perience diminishing marginal utility of money.127  That is, a dollar will
bring more satisfaction to an individual when she is poor than when she is
wealthy. For example, an additional $20 to a poor person may allow them
to purchase a new (and badly needed) pair of shoes. If the same person
were very wealthy, however, the additional $20 might be devoted to pur-
chasing a tenth pair of shoes. Because the first pair of shoes is more impor-
tant to the individual than the tenth pair, $20 bring greater satisfaction if the
individual's wealth is smaller-implying that the "marginal utility" of
money is decreasing.
The principle of risk aversion is closely related to diminishing mar-
ginal utility of wealth. 2 ' Because individuals experience diminishing mar-
ginal utility of wealth, people generally dislike gambles. The loss of a sum
causes more distress than the gain of the same sum would increase happi-
ness. 1 29 Most people, for example, would prefer $100,000 for certain as op-
125 Identical average payments to present and future claimants would be fair if future claimants
were risk-neutral (an unlikely assumption). Nevertheless, many mass tort bankruptcies fail to meet even
this watered-down criterion. As discussed supra note 62, future claimants tend to bear downside risk
but no upside risk. Thus, even their average award will be smaller than present claimants (in addition to
being subject to greater risk). Part III focuses on the inequities that come from unfair risk allocation to
risk-averse claimants and assumes that the inequitable average distribution to future claimants has been
solved by the Smith or Roe proposals or by the percentage-fee approach.
126 For expositional simplicity, Part III will focus on the allocation of risk between present and fu-
ture claimants. Part IV will discuss risk allocation between present claimants, future claimants, and
other creditors.
127 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 46-47 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing
diminishing marginal utility and risk aversion).
128 Id.
129 Introspection supports the notion that individuals are risk-averse. Most individuals, for exam-
ple, would not wish to put their house or wealth on the line in a double-or-nothing bet. The loss of the
individual's only house (from losing the bet) would cause more distress than the joy that would result
from winning the bet and having double the wealth or houses.
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posed to a 50% chance of receiving no dollars and a 50% chance of obtain-
ing $200,000. Although the "gamble" has the same expected value as the
certain sum (because .5 * $200,000 + .5 * $0 = $100,000), the first
$100,000 is worth more than the second $100,000 (because of diminishing
marginal utility). As a result, the individual who prefers the guaranteed
$100,000 to the 50% chance of $200,000 is deemed risk-averse. The notion
of risk aversion helps explain many types of behavior, such as the purchase
of insurance.
Tort claimants (present and future) are presumably risk-averse, like
most other individuals. 3 ° Indeed, there is reason to believe that tort claim-
ants may be particularly risk-averse.'3 ' Tort claimants have often been se-
verely injured and may have very low wealth levels, because their savings
are depleted on medical expenditures or are devoted to replacing the income
lost when an injured individual is unable to work.'32 Under most common
principles of risk aversion,'33 low wealth individuals will be more risk-
averse than individuals with average wealth levels.'34 This means that a
relatively poor individual will exhibit greater "dislike" for the $100,000
gamble described above than would a wealthy individual.
2. Certainty Equivalence.-The fact that individuals dislike risk
leads naturally to the concept of "certainty equivalence." As described
above, the fifty-fifty chance of $200,000 or zero is worth less to risk-averse
individuals than a guaranteed $100,000, even though the two scenarios have
the same expected value. Certainty equivalence, which equals the value
that an individual would place on any given gamble, helps quantify an indi-
130 See Roe, supra note 5, at 877; Smith, supra note 2, at 396.
131 See Roe, supra note 5, at 877-78 (discussing why the norm of accurate compensation in bank-
ruptcy is particularly important for future claimants because they have unique attitudes towards risk).
132 Assuming that all individuals begin with identical levels of wealth, tort claimants will have less
wealth because they have been injured and the insolvent firm is not able to compensate them com-
pletely. In reality, many tort claimants (such as people exposed to asbestos or cigarette smokers) may
begin with lower levels of wealth than average, suggesting that they may be even more risk-averse.
133 Economists generally use utility functions, or "specifications," to represent individual prefer-
ences. A utility function represents the amount of utility caused by a given amount of money (or some
other good). A utility function for a risk-averse individual will be concave. This means that the addi-
tional utility caused by an additional dollar goes down as the individual's wealth goes up.
134 For example, this will be true if individuals have preferences that exhibit constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA), a very common and intuitive utility specification. Note, however, that this will not be
true of all utility functions for risk-averse individuals. Individuals with constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) preferences will exhibit the same "amount of dislike" for fair gambles regardless of their
wealth levels. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 190-94 (1995) (discussing
various types of utility functions). See generally ANGUS DEATON, UNDERSTANDING CONSUMPTION
(1992) (presenting a wide ranging discussion of marginal utility and risk aversion in the context of con-
sumption decisions). But see Mathew Rabin, Risk Aversion and Expected- Utility Theory: A Calibration
Theorem, 68 ECONOMETRICA 1281 (2000) (questioning the applicability of observed "small-scale" lev-
els of risk aversion for ascertaining all individual's levels of aversion to large risks).
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vidual's dislike for the gamble.'35 For example, if an individual would be
willing to pay a maximum of $80,000 for the fifty-fifty chance of $200,000
or zero, then the gamble has a certainty equivalence of $80,000. Put an-
other way, this means that the individual would be indifferent between a
guaranteed sum of $80,000 and a fifty-fifty chance of $200,000 or zero.
For risk-averse individuals, the "certainty equivalent amount" of a gamble
will always be less than its expected value. Thus, the certainty equivalent
sum in our example must be less than $100,000. If an individual is exceed-
ingly risk-averse, her certainty equivalent amount for a given gamble will
be less than that of an individual who is less risk-averse. For example, an
exceedingly risk-averse person may have a certainty equivalent amount of
$40,000 for the fifty-fifty chance of $200,000 or zero. Even though the ex-
pected value of the gamble ($100,000) is much greater than $40,000, the
individual's intense aversion to risk means that he is indifferent between the
gamble with an expected value of $100,000 and a guaranteed $40,000. A
less risk-averse individual would have a higher certainty equivalent amount.
For example, a risk-neutral individual, who is untroubled by risk, would be
willing to pay $100,000 for the fifty-fifty chance of $200,000 or zero. The
certainty equivalent amount for the risk-neutral individual is the same as the
expected value.
As described above, tort claimants reasonably may be supposed to
have high levels of risk aversion because of the depletion of wealth that is
caused by their injuries. This means that they have high certainty equiva-
lent discounts relative to the expected value of a gamble. Thus, the fifty-
fifty chance of $200,000 or zero may only have a certainty equivalent value
of $40,000 to extremely risk-averse tort claimants even though this figure is
far smaller than the $100,000 expected value. Furthermore, the certainty
equivalent discount may rise as the size of the gamble increases. Thus, a
tort claimant may be willing to pay $9 for a fifty-fifty chance at $20 or zero.
The certainty-equivalence of $9 is 90% of the gamble's $10 expected value.
When the values of the gamble (and thus the gamble's risk level) are multi-
plied, however, there will be a greater divergence between the tort claim-
ant's certainty equivalent valuation of a gamble and the gamble's expected
value. Thus, the certainty equivalent of the fifty-fifty chance of $200,000
may only be $40,000, just 40% of the gamble's $100,000 expected value.
3. Diversification and Future Claimants.-Future claimants' risk
aversion in a mass tort bankruptcy is exacerbated by their inability to diver-
sify their exposure to the risky claim on the bankruptcy trust.3 6 In general,
risk-averse individuals may diversify with investments or insurance. For
135 For discussions of certainty equivalence, see PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS,
ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT 210 (1992). For a discussion of certainty equivalence in a legal con-
text, see Keith Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 458
(1998) (evaluating the relevance of certainty equivalence to punitive damage award calculations).
136 For a longer discussion of the ability of future claimants to diversify, see Part IV.A. 1.
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example, a risk-averse farmer who is greatly exposed to fluctuations in the
price of her crop may agree to futures contracts that specify in advance the
price that she will receive. This will reduce the risk for the farmer. If the
price of her crop is lower than expected, she will be protected by the higher
price in the future contracts. If the price is higher than expected, however,
the farmer will not benefit from the price rise. Overall, the farmer who sells
futures contracts will be less exposed to the risks of price fluctuations than
the farmer who does not. The futures contracts allow the farmer to diver-
sify some of the risk in the price of her product by offloading the risk to an
individual who is more willing to accept the risk that the price of the farm
product will rise or decline. Similarly, an individual may not wish to bear
all the risk of bad health. As a result, he will purchase health insurance so
that the insurer will bear some of the risk of bad health. The insurance al-
lows the individual to "diversify-away" some of the risks of bad health.
Present claimants need not worry about diversification of the risk in
their compensation because they receive their awards immediately. Future
claimants, by contrast, are unable to diversify their exposure to the risks
that result from their exposures to a harmful product and the related possi-
bility that their damage awards will be small because the total size of future
claims proves to be higher than expected.'3 7 Unharmed future claimants
may be only dimly aware (or not aware at all) of the risks of their exposure.
As a result, it is implausible that they would undertake sophisticated diver-
sification measures. In addition, if the size of the claimants' injuries are
negatively correlated with the size of their compensation, then diversifica-
tion becomes even more important.'38 Individuals will have some automatic
diversification measures from tort risks, such as health or life insurance. In
many cases, however, these will not be sufficient to eliminate the risks of
tort injury. Many individuals are underinsured or even uninsured.'39 For
example, a large proportion of individuals purchase little or no life insur-
ance.'40 These factors suggest that future claimants' relative inability to di-
versify may thus play an important role in the analysis of risk allocation that
follows.
137 For a full discussion of the negative correlation between the size of future claimants' injuries
and the size of their compensation (and the resulting lack of diversification), see Part V.A. I.
138 For related analysis, see the discussion in Part IV.A.
139 See MetLife Group Life, Benefit Solutions for Business: A Perspective on Group Life Insurance
2, available at http://www.metlife.com/WPSAssets/14778534621022699283VIFA%2OPerspective%
20on%20Group%20Life.pdf (last visited July 14, 2003).
140 Id.
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B. Allocation of Risk in Mass Tort Bankruptcies: Current Practice and
Theory
1. Defining "Fair" Risk Allocations.-All bankruptcies involve
some allocation of risk because of the inherently uncertain nature of a
firm's future cash flows.'4 ' For example, some creditors receive equity in a
reorganized company while others receive debt claims. Because debt has
higher priority in bankruptcy, it is a less risky security than equity, and this
risk allocation may treat otherwise identical creditors in disparate fashions.
However, these disparate risk allocations are not problematic for two rea-
sons. First, the absolute priority rule protects creditors.'42 Because equity is
riskier than debt, markets generally price equity securities at a discount for
a given expected return.'43 Since the absolute priority rule ensures that
similarly situated creditors should receive similar values, the exact method
of risk allocation is immaterial so long as the values of the different securi-
ties received by different creditors, as determined in the market for such se-
curities, respect absolute priority. Second, the ability to buy and sell the
securities issued by the reorganized firm in an efficient, liquid capital mar-
ket render the individual risk preferences of creditors irrelevant with respect
to the determination of the values of these claims. If a particularly risk-
averse creditor receives riskier equity rather than safer debt, he can easily
sell his claim for cash if he chooses. Even if markets are illiquid, the risk
allocations are the result of a negotiation process.'" As a result, the risk al-
locations presumably reflect preferences towards risk. If one class of credi-
tors is more risk-tolerant than another, or is restricted from holding
securities of a particular type, it is likely that this class will receive securi-
ties that match its preferences as a result of the bankruptcy negotiation.
Similar to the inherent risk in future cash flows from a firm's opera-
tions, risk of future claims is an unavoidable element of mass tort bankrupt-
cies. Future claims risk presents a uniquely problematic issue for
bankruptcy, however. Because of inherent epidemiological uncertainties, it
may be very difficult for courts and creditors to properly "price" the risk in
future claims. Even if such risk were easily priced in the marketplace, the
individual risk preferences of the future claimants should still be relevant
information to the court. Because the identity and severity of these future
claims is unknown at the time the reorganization plan is confirmed, future
141 See Roe, supra note 5, at 876-79.
142 The principles of the absolute priority rule are embodied in II U.S.C. §§ 1122-1129 (2000).
The absolute priority rule requires that a senior class be paid in full before a junior class obtains any
value in a reorganization plan. See BAIRD, supra note 35, at 62-78 (1992) (discussing the absolute pri-
ority rule).
143 See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET (5th ed. 1990), reprinted in
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 29-32 (Roberta Romano ed., 1993).
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claimants do not receive tradeable claims on the trust, as an ordinary credi-
tor would receive in bankruptcy. In effect, each future claimant in a mass
tort bankruptcy holds an extremely risky claim she cannot sell. As a result,
future claimants may not receive the risk allocation that is most efficient if
the FCR does not represent their preferences appropriately.
Bankruptcy courts thus need a normative goal for evaluating the allo-
cation of risk that results from mass tort bankruptcies. Using hypothetical
choice analysis, Professor Smith offers an excellent starting point for this
procedure.'45 Smith assumes that behind a veil of ignorance, "prospective
tort creditors would not agree to an allocational [sic] scheme that paid pre-
sent claimants more than future claimants; rather, they would select a
scheme that treated present and future equally."'46 We modify Smith's con-
clusion. While completely equal treatment is a worthy goal, it is essentially
unattainable when future claims are risky. Instead, we propose that indi-
viduals would choose a framework whereby tort creditors would be indif-
ferent between becoming a present or future claimant. Because claimants
are risk-averse and perfect equality across claimants is difficult to attain, we
suggest that the risk/return parameters of present and future claimants'
bankruptcy outcomes should make prospective claimants indifferent be-
tween becoming present or future claimants.'47
The simplest way to eliminate the uncertainty in the size of future
claims is to delay compensation to present claimants and wait until the un-
certainty is resolved. If the size of future claims were known with certainty,
perfectly equal compensation could be awarded to present and future claim-
ants. While appealingly simple, this procedure fails to satisfy the indiffer-
145 See Smith, supra note 2, at 378-82. Hypothetical choice analysis posits the following hypo-
thetical: suppose that all parties to bankruptcy negotiation were behind a veil of ignorance such that
none of the parties were aware of their actual place in the reorganization plan, e.g., no party knows
whether it will be a present claimant or future claimant. Hypothetical choice analysis asks what out-
come would be chosen by the parties in this state-when opinions are unbiased by personal circum-
stances. For discussions of hypothetical choice analysis, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-
17 (1971); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 7-19 (1986) (applying
hypothetical choice analysis to bankruptcy law); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Re-
form: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 357-60 (1988) (summarizing hypothetical choice
analysis in a products liability framework). But see Smith, supra note 2, at 379 n.52 (explaining why
hypothetical bargain analysis does not apply seamlessly to bankruptcy law); Barry E. Adler, Financial
and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993) (asserting that
bankruptcy does not solve an intractable and inefficient "common-pool" problem, and thereby implying,
but not stating explicitly, that there is no contracting failure requiring the use of hypothetical bargain
analysis to bankruptcy).
146 Smith, supra note 2, at 380.
147 This analysis focuses on tradeoffs between present and future claimants. It does not consider
the preferences of individuals who were exposed to the harmful product but never become injured. Be-
cause our analysis ensures that future claimants are treated as well as present claimants, however, it re-
moves the rationale for as-yet-unharmed individuals to seek damages. If they wait and develop injury,
they are adequately protected as future claimants, while if they remain uninjured then they are not enti-
tled to damages.
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ence criterion. Although present and future claimants receive equal pay-
ments, present claimants must wait for many periods before receiving any
compensation. During these periods, present claimants may have desperate
needs for funds to compensate them for medical needs or lost earnings that
result from their injuries.'48 Future claimants, by contrast, receive compen-
sation as their injuries manifest themselves. As a result, the "wait and see"
approach fails the indifference criterion; prospective claimants would prefer
to become future claimants rather than present claimants. 4 9
We will now evaluate the risk allocation strategies of the cases and
proposals discussed in Part II with respect to the "indifference criterion"
developed here.
2. Risk Allocations in Past Bankruptcies and the FAIR Act.-As ex-
amined in Part II, the Johns-Manville bankruptcy did not provide a "fair"
distribution to future claimants-present claimants received much greater
compensation than future claimants. Much of this discrepancy stemmed
from the inaccurate estimation of the number of future claimants. As de-
scribed above, these inaccuracies were not simply the result of bad luck but
also of systematic biases against future claimants.
Suppose, however, that these biases were eliminated and that the esti-
mates chosen in the Manville bankruptcy reorganization were appropriate.
Even under this scenario, present and future claimants could not be assured
equivalent outcomes. An estimate, even if well chosen, is still an estimate.
Because present and future claimants both received compensation from the
Manville personal injury settlement and the size of the fund was fixed,' the
average return on any claimant's liquidated claim was subject to the risk in
future claims.' 5' The average return can be calculated by dividing the size
of the fund by the size of total claims. Because future claims are subject to
uncertainty, the average return was also subject to uncertainty. The risk in
148 Complete capital markets could facilitate the "wait and see" approach. If present claimants
could sell their prospective tort claims for a fair price to "move forward" their compensation, then the
"wait and see" approach would not suffer from these defects. Indeed, if the capital markets were com-
plete, then this strategy would be identical to Smith's capital markets approach described above in Part
II.B.2. Smith's tort instruments serve to facilitate the development of capital markets for the wait and
see approach. As described below in Part I1.B.3, however, Smith's capital markets approach also fails
the indifference criterion.
149 A related way to understand this concept is to assume that present claimants' discount rates ex-
ceed the interest rates that claimants would earn with funds set aside for them under the "wait and see"
approach. As a result, they would strongly prefer not to wait but rather to receive their compensation
immediately.
150 See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 752-53 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y.
1991) (specifying the assets of the Manville trust fund and implicitly limiting the trust fund to the assets
specified).
151 The average return refers to the percentage of any liquidated claim that was recouped. Thus, if
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the average return had to be allocated amongst the present and future claim-
ants.
The Manville bankruptcy allocated the risk to the future claimants.
The Manville trust chose a "first-in-first-out" payment plan.'52 That is, the
claimants were compensated as their claims were presented to the trust.
Moreover, claimants received 100% of their claims as specified in the reor-
ganization plan. Thus, present claimants received the full value of their
claims with no risk, while payments to future claimants were subject to a
great deal of risk. Because payments were awarded in full, if future claims
exceeded expectations (a real possibility even if the estimates were method-
ologically sound), then the last arriving claimants would receive nothing. If
future claims equaled expectations, however, both present and future claim-
ants would have received the full value of their claims.
Even if the bankruptcy court had chosen the right estimation proce-
dures, the norm of claimant-status indifference developed above suggests
that the Manville bankruptcy did not achieve a fair distribution. Prospective
claimants would have preferred the status of present claimants for two rea-
sons. First, the present claimants' awards were not subject to risk while the
future claimants' award amounts were very risky. Because prospective
claimants are risk-averse, the risk in the future claimants' awards would
make the position of the early claimants more attractive, even if future
claimants frequently received the same award as present claimants. Second,
the bankruptcy settlement did not specify the procedures for allocating ex-
cess funds in the event that future claims proved lower than expected. It
seems unlikely, however, that future claimants would have received more
than 100% return on their claims. If future claimants could not have re-
ceived more than 100%, then the settlement trust was biased against them:
it allowed for recovery of less than 100%, but not more.'53 This settlement
structure implies that future claimants would receive less than 100% of their
claims on average while present claimants would always receive 100%.
Other bankruptcy settlements have also failed to follow the indiffer-
ence norm. Instead they have apparently attempted to ensure that present
and future claimants receive the same average claim. For example, the fund
resulting from the asbestos-related bankruptcy of UNR Industries'54 was in-
adequate to compensate all claimants fully. Knowing this, the claimants'
fund trustees did not fully compensate present claimants, choosing instead
to award present claimants a lump-sum percentage of their claims. The
152 MANVILLE SETrLEMENT HISTORY, supra note 53.
153 While this approach may seem understandable (why should tort claimants receive more than
100% of their claims?), it fails to recognize that tort claimants must be compensated for bearing risk.
Implementing the risk priority approach, described in Part IV.D, will prevent an overestimation of
claims from creating excessive awards to future claimants.
154 See UNARCO Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 268, 272 (N.D. Ill.
1990).
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award percentages were apparently chosen to equilibrate awards for all
claimants. Thus, if total claims were expected to be five times as high as
the funds available in the trust, then present claimants received 20% of their
claims."'
While an improvement over the Manville procedure, the UNR proce-
dure failed to satisfy the indifference criterion. Risk-averse prospective
claimants would prefer a certain payment amounting to 20% of their claims
(as received by the present claimants) as opposed to a risky payment with
an expected value of 20% (as received by future claimants).
The risk allocation specified by the asbestos trust fund created by the
FAIR Act is eerily reminiscent of the risk allocation in previous mass tort
bankruptcies. All claimants are due to receive the same fixed claim for a
given injury.'56 Should asbestos claims equal expectations, the fund will be
sufficient to pay present and future claimants equally.'57 If claims exceed
expectations and the fund is depleted, however, then future claimants will
suffer because present claimants have already been compensated while fu-
ture claimants are left to seek compensation from a depleted fund.
The FAIR Act is unfair to future claimants with respect to present
claimants along a number of dimensions. First, future claimants receive
smaller compensation than present claimants on average because future
claimants will receive equal compensation with respect to present claimants
only if future claims fall short or equal expectations.' 8 If future claims ex-
ceed expectations, however, then future claimants receive less than present
claimants; average compensation for future claimants is therefore below av-
erage compensation for present claimants. Second, even if future claimants
receive the same average compensation as present claimants, the future
claimants are exposed to more risk. While present claimants are reasonably
certain to receive the amount specified by statute, future claimants' pay-
ments are subject to risk because the fixed amount in the fund must be
shared amongst a variable number of claimants. As a result, a prospective
claimant would prefer to be in the present claimants' position even if aver-
age payments for present and future claimants are equal. The lower risk of
the present claimants' position makes it more attractive.
3. Risk Allocation in Smith's Capital Markets Approach.-Smith's
capital markets approach raises the probability that the appropriate estima-
tion procedures would be employed for determining funding for future
155 For a description of the UNR procedures, see GIBSON, supra note 17, at 173-74.
156 See, e.g., Hearings on Asbestos Litigation, supra note 14, at http://judiciary.senate.gov
/print testimony.cfm?id=777&witid 2186 (testimony of Ms. Jennifer L. Biggs, describing fixed
awards for claimants regardless of the timing of their claim).
157 Id.
158 A review of the FAIR Act revealed no provision for future claimants to receive higher per capita
compensation than present claimants if future claims fall short of expectations. Id.
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claimants 59 While this is an important improvement, the capital markets
approach does not necessarily satisfy the indifference criterion described
above. Indeed, the capital markets approach satisfies the indifference crite-
rion only under two scenarios: if the market prices the risky future payout
stream as would a future claimant, or if future claimants are able to diver-
sify cheaply-two very unlikely scenarios.
An example helps to illustrate the drawbacks in Smith's approach. Re-
call that his approach calls for one tradable share in a tort instrument to be
issued for each dollar of liquidated tort claims. The tort instrument holds
assets that are distributed pro rata to shareholders after all tort claims are
determined. As in our previous example, assume that the trust fund owns
assets worth $1 billion, and that present claimants have $500 million in liq-
uidated claims. Now assume that all future claims will be realized in year
ten. Thus, the tort instrument pays its $1 billion pro rata in year ten. Now
assume that future claims can either be $500 million or $1 billion, each with
50% probability. In the first year of the tort instrument's existence, the pre-
sent claimants receive 500 million shares. The value of these shares in ten
years depends upon the size of future claims. If future claims equal $500
million, then all the shares in the trust fund will be worth $1 each, since the
trust owns $1 billion in assets and aggregate tort claims total $1 billion.6 ° If
future claims equal $1 billion, then each share will be worth $.667, because
the tort instrument will have issued 1.5 billion total shares and has $1 bil-
lion in assets. Because the two outcomes are equally likely, the expected
value of a share is $.833.16t Suppose that present claimants attempt to sell
their shares in the tort instrument on a well developed market. Financial
theory suggests that non-injured participants in the tort instrument market
are effectively neutral with respect to risk in the number and size of future
claims. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), for example, predicts
that only systematic risk, the risk that cannot be eliminated by diversifica-
tion, receives a market premium. 6 ' Unless the future claims risk is corre-
lated with economy-wide sources of risk (such as risks in oil prices,
weather, etc.), the "beta" of the tort instrument is zero. 63 As a result, it will
159 For a detailed description of the capital markets approach, see Part II.B.3.
160 There were $500 million in present claims and $500 million in future claims for a total of $1 bil-
lion.
161 .833 = .5 * $1 + .5 * S.667.
162 For a discussion of the CAPM model, see MARK GRINBLATT & SHERIDAN TITMAN, FINANCIAL
MARKETS AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 151-54 (2d ed. 2002). For a discussion of the types of risk and
the pricing of risk in the CAPM model, see id. at 178-81.
163 Beta is a term of art in the CAPM model and is related to the covariance of a given asset return
with the market portfolio return. See id. at 178-81.
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receive no risk premium over a risk-free bond."6 Consequently, present
claimants should receive certain payment of approximately $.833 per share.
Future claimants, by contrast, continue to hold shares in the instrument
(prospectively). While these shares have an expected value of $.833, the
shares' payout is risky. Sometimes the shares will be worth $.667 and
sometimes they will be worth $1. Thus, a risk-averse prospective tort
claimant would not be indifferent between becoming a present or future
claimant. Future claimants' expected return is the same as present claim-
ants', but future claimants' returns are riskier. Thus, a risk-averse prospec-
tive claimant would prefer the present claimants' position."' If future
claimants can sell their prospective tort shares, of course, then present and
future claimants' positions are equivalent. It is very unlikely, however, that
future claimants, who may be unaware of the risks of injury, will be both
willing and able to sell their unrealized claims in the market. As a result, all
future tort claimants will effectively hold large amounts of a risky security
with no potential for diversification. This position is inferior to that of pre-
sent claimants, who can diversify effectively.
Thus, Smith's capital markets approach, while offering a creative solu-
tion for estimating the number of future claimants, does not satisfy the in-
difference criterion described above. It is an incomplete solution to the fair
distribution problem.'66
4. Risk Allocation in the Variable Annuity Approach.-Roe's vari-
able annuity approach reduces the risk borne by future claimants because it
delays some payments to present claimants. Instead of allocating all the
risk to future claimants, the risk in the size of future claims is partially
shared by present claimants.'67 Roe recognizes, however, that some risk
164 Even if the market was not completely risk-neutral with respect to the risk in future claims, it is
very likely that it will be more risk-tolerant than claimants, for whom tort instruments may constitute a
large portion of total assets.
165 Even if a prospective future claimant is not aware that she has been harmed at all, she is still ex-
posed to excess risk. This type of claimant is exposed to two types of risk: (1) the chance that she will
be harmed at all and (2) the chance that her harm will prove greater or less than expected, given that she
is harmed. In a world with perfect insurance markets, individuals would be able to diversify both types
of risk. Bounded rationality, incomplete information, and defects in insurance markets, however, pre-
vent perfect risk sharing. Thus, this paper attempts to facilitate risk sharing (or appropriate risk compen-
sation) from the considerable risks that fall upon all individuals in category 2, thus helping reduce, but
not eliminate, the diversification problem.
166 It is worthwhile to note that the indifference criterion could be satisfied within the framework
proposed by Smith if future claimants are given more tort shares than present claimants for a given in-
jury to compensate them for bearing the additional future claimant risk.
167 Because the variable annuity approach proposed by Roe is just one of many innovations pro-
posed in his seminal paper, it is incompletely specified. For example, the numerical example presented
to illustrate the variable annuity approach does not account for all the funds available to tort claimants.
See Roe, supra note 5, at 873-74. Because individual A in his numerical example does not receive the
entire amount of funds available from the annuity in year 1 (A receives $20,000 out of the $40,000
available), there should be a greater amount of funds available in year 2. Instead, Roe assumes that the
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will remain and that the variable annuity approach reduces rather than
eliminates disparities between present and future claimants.'68 Because the
annual payout of the variable annuity received by early claimants will be
based upon an averaged "best estimate" of future claims, the compensation
received by early claimants will be less risky than that received by future
claimants, as averages are less risky than extremes.'69 Thus, the variable
annuity approach does not satisfy the indifference criterion; prospective
claimants would prefer to be present claimants rather than future claim-
ants.'7 ° Present claimants bear less of the risk in future claims than future
claimants, while present claimants and future claimants receive the same
amounts on average.
5. Insurance.-In addition to the variable annuity approach, Roe also
advocates the use of insurance in solving the risk allocation problem.'7 '
Rather than using the assets of an injury settlement fund to compensate tort
claimants directly, the trustee of a fund could use the assets to purchase in-
surance. The insurance company, in turn, would agree to pay all claimants,
present and future, a fixed percentage of liquidated damages as the damage
claims become established. The insurance company would thus bear the
risk in the size of future claims: if future claims surpassed expectations,
then the insurance company would suffer, as it had committed to paying all
claimants the fixed percentage. If future claims fell short of expectations,
then the insurance company would benefit. Tort claimants would no longer
be exposed to the risk in future claims. Regardless of the size of aggregate
claims, both present and future claimants would receive the fixed percent-
age of damages specified in the insurance contract. Thus, insurance along
the lines specified would satisfy the indifference criterion.'
same amount is available in both years ($40,000 in each year). Roe also fails to explain how to allocate
the surplus from year 1.
168 Id. at 874 (noting that that the "variable annuity analogy will not eliminate uncertainty or inac-
curacy in compensation of the tort victims inter se").
169 Roe recognizes that a more conservative approach might be justified but states that the best es-
timate approach is preferable and that the choice of procedures is not particularly crucial. Id. at 872-73.
Given the levels of epidemiological uncertainty and risk aversion, these conclusions are not correct. The
"best estimate" (averaging approach) does an inadequate job of accounting for risk aversion, and this
constitutes a substantial omission in Roe's otherwise superb analysis.
170 The fact that prospective claimants would prefer to be present claimants is related to the eco-
nomic notion of the declining price anomaly in which risk-averse people are willing to pay more for a
bird in the hand if there is uncertainty about how much demand will be present in later auctions. For a
discussion of the declining price anomaly, see Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, Deficit Reduction Through
Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition, 48 STAN. L. REV. 761,
782-83 (1996).
171 See Roe, supra note 5, at 879-84.
172 Another insurance-based solution relies upon potential future claimants to purchase individual
insurance policies against the possibility of future injuries. Many future claimants may be unaware (or
only dimly aware) of the risks that they face. As a result, it is highly unlikely that this "solution" would
be effective. For more discussion, see id. at 883-84.
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But Roe identifies several factors that prevent insurance from offering
a simple solution to the risk distribution problem.13 First, he suggests that
because mass torts involve massive uncertainties about very large risks, in-
surance would only be available at a prohibitive premium.'74 Because epi-
demiological risks are so difficult to quantify, the actuarial tables relied
upon by insurers will be difficult to create.'75 As a result, insurers will be
unsure about a profitable premium; mistakes will be inevitable. Moreover,
mass torts involve large sums that may equal the capitalization of an insur-
ance company-a poor estimate runs the risk of bankrupting the insurance
company. This combination of large and ill-defined risks suggests that in-
surance companies may demand outsized premiums. Because the indiffer-
ence criterion is not an absolute requirement, it may be reasonable for
trustees or judges to forego the purchase of some insurance in order to pro-
tect the absolute size of the fund for claimants facing prohibitive premiums.
Second, insurers are also likely to require that their liability be capped at
some amount.'76 Insurance that is subject to caps will not satisfy the indif-
ference criterion because future claimants will bear all the risk that present
claimants will reach the cap-should claims exceed the cap, there will be
no compensation available for late-arriving future claimants.
If anything, Roe's analysis underplays the difficulties of insurance.
The value of liquidated claims may not be invariant to the choice of insur-
ance. If judges, juries, and fund trustees know that a deep-pocketed insurer
is compensating plaintiffs, the size of damage awards may rise. In addition,
adverse selection problems may plague the market for tort insurance. Be-
cause the size of aggregate claims is so uncertain, insurers may suspect that
any trustee who attempts to purchase insurance for future claimants may
have private information suggesting that the number of claimants will be
large. In response, the insurer will require an even higher premium.
These concerns appear to be empirically important. Although insur-
ance is a seemingly obvious potential solution to the problem of future
claims risk, it has generally not played a prominent role in the elimination
of future claims risk. For example, the assets of the Dow-Corning breast-
173 See id. at 879-884.
174 Recall, for example, that in 1984, estimates of asbestos liability ranged from $8 billion to $87
billion. Id. at 872 n.73.
175 Thus, epidemiological risk is not only subject to considerable variance, but it is also difficult to
determine the variance itself. Insurance companies are capable of dealing with high variance-they
simply charge an appropriate premium. Ill-defined variance, however, raises even thomier problems.
For further discussion on this point, see the discussion supra at note 83. See generally GUIDO
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 39-67 (1970) (discussing
the problems of "loss spreading" and insurance for tort victims).
176 Liability caps are ubiquitous. For example, the federal government is perhaps the least likely
insurer to ever declare bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the federal government has specified a liability cap for
its function as an insurer of last resort for acts of terrorism. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-297, Title I, § 103(e)(2), 116 Stat. 2322 (2002).
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implant fund were all in cash-the fund purchased no insurance.'77 Even
when insurance has been used to protect future claimants, its capacity has
been small compared to total assets. The fund protecting the injured
Dalkon Shield users in the A.H. Robins related mass tort bankruptcy, for
example, held only $350 million in insurance, protecting from the possibil-
ity that claims would exceed the value of fund assets.' This amount was a
small percentage of the total value of assets in the fund, which were ap-
proximately $2.475 billion.
179
In spite of these considerable difficulties, insurance should play a
greater role in protecting future claimants. Because injured claimants may
be particularly risk-averse, I18 future claimants (if they could express their
preferences) may be willing to pay unusually steep premiums for insurance.
FCRs and trustees should account for these preferences. Thus, insurance,
even if it is capped, should play an important role in allocating risk fairly
between present and future claimants.
C. Solutions to the Fair Distribution Problem: A Certainty Equivalent
Approach
Because insurance is no panacea, mass tort bankruptcies must develop
more effective procedures for ensuring that risk is distributed more equita-
bly between present and future claimants. These procedures should attempt
to satisfy the indifference criterion while also adhering to the other aims of
bankruptcy, such as enabling the productive use of assets and upholding ab-
solute priority.
To improve the allocation of risk between present and future claimants,
we advocate a "certainty equivalent" approach. For expositional simplicity,
assume that tort claimants receive their damage awards in one lump sum, 8'
177 See GIBSON, supra note 17, at 228 (describing the funding of the breast-implant fund and never
mentioning any insurance coverage).
178 See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 721-22 (4th Cir. 1989).
179 GIBSON, supra note 17, at 197.
180 For a discussion of this issue, see Part III.A.
181 Note, however, that the certainty equivalent approach does not require lump-sum payments. In-
deed, we strongly recommend the adoption of the variable annuity approach to reduce the disparities be-
tween present and future claimants. Even if the variable annuity approach is adopted, however, future
claimants will still bear a disproportionate amount of risk. Because present claimants have immediate
liquidity needs, they will receive some variable annuity payments "up front." These payments will not
be subject to risk. As a result, present claimants bear less risk than future claimants, although the differ-
ence in isk-bearing is smaller than if present claimants received a lump-sum. Thus, the certainty
equivalent approach used here could be employed to improve both the Roe and Smith proposals, as dis-
cussed in Part III.D.3. Note also that this approach implicitly assumes that it will not be possible to re-
cover money once it has been paid to claimants. Attempts at recovery from overcompensated claimants
who are no longer receiving further compensation would "clash severely with the norm of repose." Roe,
supra note 5, at 872 n.71.
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in accord with current practice.'82 Awarding lump-sum damages, however,
allocates all risk associated with the size of future claims to the future
claimants; so long as damage awards are funded by assets fixed in size dur-
ing the bankruptcy proceeding, a higher lump-sum payment to present
claimants translates into fewer funds available for future claimants. While
the present claimant has already received her award (and thus faces no risk),
a future claimant faces the risk that the fund will be depleted when his claim
"matures."'83 As a result, we do not recommend that payments to present
and future claimants aim for absolute equality. Instead, future claimants
should receive higher average payments that reflect the greater risk level of
their damage awards. The value of the present claimants' fixed award
should equal the "certainty equivalent" value of the future claimants' risky
awards. Because risk-averse individuals discount risky payments, the cer-
tainty equivalent value of the future claimants' risky outcomes will be less
than the expected value of the future claimants' awards, implying that the
certainty equivalent approach will (on average) award less compensation in
dollar terms to present claimants than to future claimants.
The certainty equivalent approach compensates future claimants for
bearing additional risk. For example, future claimants to the FAIR Act trust
fund should receive larger awards than present claimants if total claims per-
fectly meet expectations. This approach would compensate future claim-
ants for the risk that future claims will exceed expectations (thus allowing
future claimants only minimal compensation). In addition, the certainty
equivalent approach ensures that extra funds are available when they are
most needed, i.e., when future claims prove unexpectedly large. Future
claims may be surprisingly large for a combination of two reasons: the
number of claimants may exceed expectations or the size of each future
claimant's claim may surpass predictions. In either case, future claimants
will have a particularly acute need for funds. If the magnitude of future
claimants' injuries proves high, then each claimant may have extraordinary
182 For example, the Johns-Manville and UNR tort claimants received lump-sum payments. See the
description of these bankruptcies in Part III.B.2.
183 This assumes that prospective claimants will wait until their claims are manifested before re-
questing damages. In recent asbestos cases, however, many claimants with "inchoate" claims have de-
manded compensation before any actual damages arose. We believe that these inchoate claims should
be discouraged because it is very difficult to properly assess them. Inchoate claims also act as anti-
insurance-all inchoate claimants receive small awards, regardless of their ultimate damages. Proper
insurance, by contrast, would have inchoate claimants who ultimately become injured receive large
awards while inchoate claimants who are not damaged should receive nothing. We also believe that our
"certainty equivalent" and "percentage-fee" approaches will mitigate the problem of inchoate claims. At
present, a prospective future claimant may, knowing that future claimants commonly receive an unfair
distribution, prefer a certain, small payment as an inchoate claimant. If the certainty equivalent and per-
centage-fee approaches are adopted, however, future claimants will be fairly treated. As a result, there
will be less incentive for prospective future claimants to push forward inchoate claims. In addition, ju-
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medical needs. On the other hand, if the number of future claimants sur-
passes predictions, then the compensatory funds will have to be shared with
a large group, potentially preventing needy individuals from obtaining ade-
quate compensation.'84 Of course, if the size of future claims falls short of
expectations, then the certainty equivalent approach will leave a large sum
available for relatively few claimants. However, this "downside" of the
certainty equivalent approach is outweighed by the desirability of ensuring
adequate funds when future claims are unexpectedly large and claimants are
particularly needy.'85
For example, suppose that there are two claimants, one present and one
future.'86 Each claimant has lifetime wealth of $1.5 million, not including
damage awards.'87 The present claimant's damages are equal to $1 million,
while the future claimant's damages may be either $500,000 or $1.5 mil-
lion, each with equal probability. The discount and interest rates are zero.
Suppose further that there is a total of $1 million in a trust fund available to
compensate both claimants and that the interest rate and discount rates are
zero. Both the present and future claimants have the same expected damage
value of $1 million. If risk were not a factor, this would imply that they
should share the fund evenly, i.e., they should both receive $500,000. By
contrast, the certainty equivalence approach suggests that the present and
future claimant receive the same certainty equivalent damage awards, i.e.,
that the future claimant should receive more, on average, than the present
claimant so that the present claimant's award equals the certainty equivalent
of the future claimant's uncertain need for damages. The size of the cer-
tainty equivalence premium will depend upon the degree of risk aversion
exhibited by the future claimants. For simplicity, we represent the claim-
ants' risk aversion using a logarithmic utility function. The logarithmic
utility function offers a convenient means of translating the qualitative no-
tions of risk aversion and diminishing marginal utility into quantities that
can be used to illustrate the certainty equivalent approach numerically.'88
Under these assumptions, present claimants should be awarded approxi-
184 Both of these statements are a direct result of the assumption of diminishing marginal utility.
See Part llI.A.1.
185 This statement follows from the assumption of diminishing marginal utility as well as the
closely related assumption of convex marginal utility. For a discussion of the convexity of marginal util-
ity, see DEATON, supra note 134, at 177-78.
186 For simplicity, this example focuses on the case in which the number of future claimants is
known but the size of the future claimants' claims is unknown. The qualitative character of the results
would be identical if both these quantities were allowed to vary. The quantitative results would change
slightly, however. Awards to future claimants would be awarded even more conservatively when both
the number and size of future claims are allowed to vary because of the chance that there will be many
severely injured individuals, rather than just one as in the example presented here.
187 While this number may appear high, it is realistic if an appropriately broad definition of wealth
that includes human capital (among other things) is considered.
188 For discussions of functional forms of utility functions, see DEATON, supra note 134, at 64;
MAS-COLLEL ET AL., supra note 134, at 190-94.
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mately $438,000, while future claimants will receive the remainder, or
$562,000.189 These amounts would satisfy the indifference norm. A pro-
spective claimant would be approximately indifferent between the follow-
ing options: (1) having a $1 million injury along with an award of
$438,000, or (2) having a 50% chance of a $500,000 injury and a 50%
chance of a $1.5 million injury along with an award of $562,000.190
Although the actual monetary award to each claimant is fixed, the per-
centage of the future claimant's injury that is compensated remains risky
because the size of the injury is uncertain. This uncertainty is not the
"fault" of the future claimant. Instead, it arises because mass tort bankrupt-
cies seek to discharge future tort obligations of uncertain size. The future
claimant should not be punished by the discharge. Thus, future claimants
should receive "more" than present claimants, in spite of the fact that both
present and future claimants have the same expected claims values. This
premium compensates future claimants for the additional risk, ensuring that
adequate funds will be available, should the future claimants' injuries prove
to be unexpectedly large and situations in which the future claimant has a
particularly desperate need for funds (i.e., when the future claimant's inju-
ries equal $1.5 million). Although the certainty equivalent approach also
raises the possibility of awarding future claimants more than present claim-
ants (i.e., when a future claimant's injuries equal $500,000), the need to as-
sure adequate funding for future claimants outweighs the disadvantage of
overcompensating future claimants where claims fall short of expectations.
Furthermore, the certainty equivalent approach will occasionally allow the
future claimant to receive an award that exceeds the value of the injury. For
example, the future claimant's award ($562,000) will exceed the injury
when the injury equals $500,000. While seemingly counterintuitive, this
outcome is necessary to ensure equitable treatment for the inherently "more
exposed" position of the future claimant.
This example does not seem unreasonable. Mass tort injuries involv-
ing death or severe injury may easily involve risks this large. Epidemiol-
ogical uncertainties often mean that future damages to a given exposed
individual involve greater risk than that presented here. Moreover, while
the example focused on the case where the number of claimants is fixed, in
reality, both the magnitude of each claim and the number of future claims
are uncertain. If future claims are unexpectedly high in both magnitude and
number, then the need for funds will be particularly great, potentially justi-
fying a large premium for future claimants under the certainty equivalent
approach. Thus, the certainty equivalent approach may often entail a quan-
189 These results are obtained by solving for the variable x in the following equation:
ln($1,500,000 - $1,000,000 + x) = .51n($1,500,000 - $500,000 + ($1,000,000 - x)) +
.51n($1,500,000 -$1,500,000 + ($1,000,000- x))
190 Note that the actual size of the award for future claimants is fixed ($562,000). The percentage
of the injury that is compensated remains risky, however, because the size of the injury is uncertain.
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titatively large departure from the current goals of equal expected compen-
sation.
D. Implementing the Certainty Equivalent Approach
While the previous section described the desirability of the certainty
equivalent approach, it provided little or no procedural guidance for imple-
menting the proposed improvements. This section discusses procedural
improvements and guidelines that will enable implementation of the cer-
tainty equivalent approach. Because the certainty equivalent approach
marks a significant departure (and improvement) over current practice, we
recommend a conservative approach to implementation. For example, the
size of the expectation premium awarded to future claimants should be con-
servatively estimated until courts acquire greater experience with the cer-
tainty equivalent approach. In addition, the desirability of implementing
the certainty equivalent approach will depend upon the availability of insur-
ance. If complete insurance can be readily and affordably purchased or if
the risk sharing scheme between claimants and other creditors described in
Part IV is adopted, then there will be little need for the certainty equivalent
approach; its benefits will be outweighed by the added complexity it entails.
Under current mass tort bankruptcy practice, however, the certainty equiva-
lent approach will engender a considerably fairer outcome making the
added complexity almost certainly worthwhile.
1. Determining the Size of the Future Claimants' Premium.-There
is no simple way to determine the appropriate size of the future claimants'
damage award premiums. One way to get a (very rough) estimate of the
size of the premium in a given case is to use asset premiums as a bench-
mark. For example, suppose that the variance in the size of future claims is
roughly similar to a particular type of asset trading in a market. By analyz-
ing the market premium for holding risky assets that is demanded by indi-
viduals with similar levels of wealth and risk aversion to those who have
been injured by a given mass tort, one can obtain a rough benchmark for the
desired premium for future claimants (who hold a risky asset in relation to
their claims). 9 ' For example, for the years 1926 to 1988, common stocks
had a mean annual return of 10%, while U.S. Treasury bills had a mean an-
nual return of 3.5%, a difference of 6.5% per year.9 2 The standard devia-
tion of annual returns for common stock was approximately six times the
191 This procedure will also have to take into account the covariance of the asset with a market as-
set, as in the CAPM model. See SHERIDAN & TITMAN, supra note 162, at 178-81. Because ill-defined
future claimants are unlikely to diversify, they may be overexposed to risk in the size of their damage
awards, particularly if this risk is correlated with their other assets. This approach would require a
greater premium for future claimants than the one that would be provided by the market valuation ap-
proach described here. It must be emphasized, however, that the speculative nature of these correlations
militates against including them in estimates of the appropriate premium.
192 See MALKIEL, supra note 143, at 28 tbl.12.
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standard deviation of returns for Treasury bills. These numbers can be ap-
plied to give a rough estimate of the appropriate premium for future claim-
ants. Suppose, for simplicity, that present and future claimants share the
market's appetite for risk. 93 If the standard deviation of future claimants'
compensation is six times higher than the standard deviation for present
claimants, then the future claimants should receive an average premium of
6.5% for each year in which they await payment.
In general, the size of the premium will depend on many factors.
These include the uncertainty in the size of future claims, the magnitude of
each individual's damages, the wealth of the injured individuals, the degree
of risk aversion of the injured individuals, and the amount of insurance pur-
chased.'94 As a result, the size of the premium is heavily context-dependent.
The "market premium" procedure described in the previous paragraph, as
well as any other procedure used to determine the certainty equivalent ap-
proach's premium for future claimants, will depend crucially upon the esti-
mates of these variables.
Fortunately, it is possible to state how this premium should vary with
the various factors mentioned above."' The effects of insurance purchases,
for example, are extremely intuitive. Suppose that all claimants are harmed
by the same amount but that the number of future claims is uncertain. Sup-
pose also that a bankruptcy trustee purchased complete insurance, ensuring
that all claimants could get a specified amount. In this case, there should be
no certainty equivalent premium-both present and future claimants hold
claims for damage awards that have no risk. As a result, they should be
treated identically.
To illustrate some of the other results, we return to the example of the
single present claimant (with damages equal to $1 million) and the single
future claimant with uncertain damages that are $1.5 million or $500,000,
each with 50% probability (with an expected value of $1 million). Total as-
sets available for distribution to all claimants remain $1 million.
193 This example ignores the distinction between systematic and idiosyncratic risk. See SHERIDAN
& TITMAN, supra note 162, at 178-81.
194 An additional complexity that has yet to be discussed concerns the possibility that future claim-
ants' claims are realized at different periods in the future. In this scenario, it is not sufficient to simply
compare present and future claimants. Instead, additional categories, such as near-future claimants and
distant-future claimants, must also be considered. If, as seems likely, the most uncertainty will surround
the value of the distant-future claimants' claims, then these claimants should receive a premium with
respect to both present claimants and near-future claimants. Near-future claimants, by contrast, should
receive only a small premium with respect to present claimants.
195 For formal proofs of these results, see Kenneth Ayotte & Yair Listokin, Optimal Trust Design in
Mass Tort Bankruptcy, available at http://wwwl.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/
ka2051/future%2Daer0/2EPDF (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). These results depend
upon the assumption of convex marginal utility as well as risk aversion.
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First, we demonstrate that less uncertainty in the size of future claims
implies a smaller premium for future claimants.'96 Suppose that the future
claimant has a 50% chance of suffering $800,000 in damages and a 50%
chance of suffering $1.2 million in damages. Thus, the expected value of
the future claimant's damages remains $1 million but the uncertainty of the
damages has decreased. Under this modification, the certainty equivalent
approach suggests that the present claimant should receive $490,000 and
the future claimant should receive $5 10,000.' 9 In the original example, by
contrast, the present claimant should receive $438,000 and the future claim-
ant $562,000. When the uncertainty in the size of future claims goes down,
the premium necessary to make prospective claimants indifferent between
becoming a present or future claimant also is reduced. This occurs because
less uncertainty means that the "worst case scenario" for the future claimant
is less undesirable. As a result, the future claimant does not need as great of
a premium as protection from the worst case scenario, and damage awards
to the present and future claimant can draw closer to numerical equality. If
there were no uncertainty in future claims, then both the present and future
claimant would receive $500,000; as one would expect, if there is no uncer-
tainty then present and future claimants should be treated identically in all
respects.
Analogously, greater wealth for present and future claimants (for a
given level of uncertainty) implies a smaller certainty equivalent premium.
Wealthier future claimants are better able to bear the risk of bad out-
comes-bad outcomes do not leave wealthier future claimants as desperate
for funds as poorer claimants would be. As a result, the premium needed to
protect future claimants from bad outcomes decreases as the wealth of fu-
ture claimants increases. Because the certainty equivalent approach has a
cost-the chance that future claimants will be overcompensated if claims
fall short of expectations-the reduction in the benefits implies that the
premium should be reduced. Again returning to the example, suppose
claimants have wealth of $1.7 million rather than $1.5 million and that the
future claimant's damages are either $500,000 or $1.5 million, each with
50% probability (as in the original example). Under these new parameters,
the future claimant should receive approximately $552,000.' 9 This award
is less than the $562,000 implied by the earlier example, showing that
196 Again, although the examples only consider uncertainty in the magnitude and not the number of
future claims, the results will be qualitatively the same if both quantities were allowed to vary. See su-
pra note 186.
197 To obtain the results in this example, solve for x in the equation:
ln($1,500,000 - $1,000,000 + x) = .51n($1,500,000 - $800,000 + ($1,000,000 x)) +
.51n($1,500,000 -$1,200,000 + ($1,000,000 - x))
198 To obtain the results in this example, solve for x in the equation:
ln($1,700,000 - $1,000,000 + x) = .51n($1,700,000 - $500,000 + ($1,000,000 - x)) +
.51n($1,700,000 -$1,500,000 + ($1,000,000- x))
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greater wealth has reduced the size of the premium necessary to protect the
future claimants.
Smaller damages for both present and future claimants also reduce the
size of the certainty equivalent premium. In a now familiar refrain, smaller
damages imply that the "worst case scenario" is less damaging for future
claimants. As a result, there is a reduced need to protect future claimants by
awarding them a certainty equivalent premium. Instead, equal expected
damage awards for both present and future claimants become more attrac-
tive. Returning to the example, suppose that the present claimant suffers
$1000 in damages, while the future claimant will suffer either $500 or
$1500 with 50% probability each. Suppose also that a total of $1000 is
available for both claimants. In this situation, our example suggests that the
present claimant should receive $499.95 while the future claimant should
receive $500.05.'99 Thus, when damages get sufficiently low, the certainty
equivalent premium becomes negligible. This implies that the certainty
equivalent approach is only empirically important when injuries are large in
reference to aggregate individual wealth. When injuries do not approach
this magnitude, the certainty equivalent approach is not worth the additional
complexity.
However, many mass tort claims will include injuries that are large
with respect to individual wealth. This reality will be especially true in the
context of mass tort bankruptcies, which, by definition, will encompass
mass tort claims large enough to threaten the solvency of a firm. Asbestos
claims, for example, are so high because asbestos exposure may result in
death or debilitating injury. As a result, the certainty equivalent approach
constitutes an important step towards constructing fair and efficient mass
tort bankruptcy procedures.
2. Estimating the Certainty Equivalent Premium in Mass Tort Bank-
ruptcies.-Estimating the size of the certainty equivalent premium
remains problematic. While the guidelines provided here may be useful,
they leave considerable ground for uncertainty and disagreement. These
uncertainties evoke those in another aspect of mass tort bankruptcies-
estimating the total amount of the damages. As with estimating the cer-
tainty-equivalence premium, there is no fixed epidemiological method for
estimating the amount of the damages. These uncertainties hinder the
ability of judges to supervise and ensure the fairness of mass tort bank-
ruptcy procedures."' 0 In response to difficulties estimating the total
amount of damages, the NBRC has proposed that the bankruptcy court
"determine the amount of mass future claims prior to confirmation of a
199 To obtain the results in this example, solve for x in the equation:
ln($1,500,000 -$1000 + x) =.51n($1,500,000 - $500 + ($1000 - x)) + .51n($1,500,000 - $1500 +
($1000 -x))
200 See Part Il.A (discussing the Johns-Manville bankruptcy).
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plan for purposes of distribution as well as allowance and voting." ''
Along these lines, we propose that bankruptcy courts should be in-
structed to determine the certainty equivalent premium as well as the esti-
mated amount of damages. Indeed, a court that is estimating the amount of
damages will be well situated to provide a rough estimate of the appropriate
certainty equivalent premium. In the context of estimating the amount of
damages, courts (along with their hired experts) should become intimately
aware of the factors that would influence the size of the certainty equivalent
premium, such as uncertainty in the size of future claims. Moreover, esti-
mating the certainty equivalent premium will not be obviously more diffi-
cult for courts and experts (both economists and statisticians) than
implementing the statistical methodologies necessary for estimating the
amount of future claims. 2 Once the certainty equivalent premium has been
estimated, the court can use this estimate in supervising the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. For example, courts should not approve a bankruptcy settlement
that exposes future claimants to greater risk than present claimants but does
not offer future claimants an appropriate premium.
The certainty equivalent premium estimated by the court may also be
used for voting purposes.2 3 If it is agreed that the risk in the number of fu-
ture claims must be borne by future claimants,20" then future claimants
should receive a premium for bearing this risk. The bankruptcy court's
ability to reject a proposal that does not include a premium for future claim-
ants may be insufficient to adequately protect future claimants. To further
protect future claimants when they are to bear the risk of future claims, it
may be advantageous to give the FCR some additional votes in bankruptcy
decisions. The additional votes should reflect the risk in the estimated
number of future claims. The greater the risk, the more the votes allocated
to the FCR should exceed the estimated value of future claims. This will
enable the FCR to exert more leverage in bankruptcy negotiations and help
ensure that future claimants receive an appropriate premium when they are
to be the bearers of risk in the number of future claims. Because future
claimants will not always bear this risk, however, it may well be preferable
201 NBRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 317.
202 Indeed, requiring the estimate of a certainty equivalent premium would spawn the development
of methodologies for estimation of these premiums. Analogously, the need for epidemiological estima-
tion of the amount of future claims has fostered the development of the statistical methodology for esti-
mation. For a discussion of some of these methodologies, see David Salsburg & Jack F. Williams, A
Statistical Approach to Claims Estimation in Bankruptcy, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1119 (1997).
203 Confirmation of a reorganization plan in bankruptcy by an impaired creditor class requires posi-
tive votes for the plan by those who hold two-thirds in amount and by those who hold a majority by
number of the allowed claims in the class. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2000).
204 Although it is not obvious that future claimants should bear the risk in the number of future
claims, bankruptcy practice suggests that this is the most likely outcome. See Parts L.A and II.B (dis-
cussing bankruptcies). Part IV presents a proposal that allocates the future claims risk to contract credi-
tors rather than claimants.
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to rely upon the bankruptcy court for the protection of their claims. This
goal can be achieved by permitting the allocation of voting rights to future
claimants according to the expected level of future claims.
3. The Certainty Equivalent Approach and the Roe and Smith Pro-
posals.-The certainty equivalent approach described here is en-
tirely consistent with the Roe and Smith approaches described above.
Indeed, the Roe and Smith proposals and the certainty equivalent approach
will all be improved by combining the best elements of each approach.
Roe's variable annuity proposal did not properly account for the risk
borne by future claimants. As a result, the variable annuity over-
compensates present claimants with respect to future claimants. To remedy
this flaw, the certainty equivalent methodology could be grafted onto the
variable annuity proposal. Variable annuity payments could be adjusted to
take into account the risk in future claims. The trustees of the variable an-
nuity should initially award funds to present claimants extremely conserva-
tively. As the risk in future claims is resolved, the trustees should adjust the
variable annuity payment along two dimensions. First, they should adjust
the awards to reflect the new information about the total amount of future
claims, as suggested by Roe. Second, the trustees should also make their
award percentages increasingly aggressive because the total amount of un-
certainty has decreased. Because future claimants arrive later, they will re-
ceive a greater award for a given claim than present claimants if future
claims equal expectations. This outcome results from the adjustment strat-
egy undertaken by the annuity's trustees. When claims equal expectations,
there is no need for the trustees to change their procedures to account for
new information. As a result, the variable annuity payment will increase,
and trustees may award payments more aggressively due to the declining
need for additional funds in reserve (i.e., aggressive payment becomes in-
creasingly viable as uncertainty is resolved). The chance of very bad out-
comes, which drives the certainty equivalent approach, is reduced as the
uncertainty is resolved in accord with expectations. Because future claim-
ants begin receiving payments later than present claimants, they will enjoy
more of the benefits from the late-arriving aggressive awards than do pre-
sent claimants. This does not unfairly benefit future claimants, however.
Instead, this approach compensates future claimants for bearing greater risk
in the payment of variable annuities. Should claims exceed expectations,
then all of the future claimants' variable annuity payments will be adjusted
downwards. Only some of the present claimants' claims will be moved
downward, however, because present claimants will have received some
variable annuity payments before the revelation of unexpectedly large fu-
ture claims.2"5
205 This conclusion assumes that variable annuity payments can not be taken back. Taking back
payments would violate the right of repose. See Roe, supra note 5, at 872 n.71. An additional possibil-
ity not mentioned by Roe would involve adjusting the variable annuity payments for past awards. In this
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In turn, the variable annuity approach would also improve upon the
certainty equivalent approach. When the certainty equivalent approach in-
volves the payments of lump-sums to all claimants, the size of the certainty
equivalent premium must often be large because future claimants bear all
the risk in future claims. °6 Awarding compensation gradually, the variable
annuity approach allocates some of the risk in future claims to present
claimants.2 7 This sharing of risk reduces the size of the certainty equivalent
premium necessary to make prospective claimants indifferent between pre-
sent and future statuses. As a result, the variable annuity approach reduces
the chance that future claimants will receive much larger awards than pre-
sent claimants when future claims fall short of expectations. With the
lump-sum certainty equivalent approach, by contrast, future claimants must
occasionally receive seemingly excessive awards in order to protect future
claimants from the possibility that future claims will greatly exceed expec-
tations.
The certainty equivalent approach enjoys a similarly symbiotic combi-
nation with Smith's capital markets approach. As discussed above, Smith's
proposal, like Roe's, fails to account properly for the risk borne by future
claimants. Although present and future claimants receive the same com-
pensation on average, present claimants' compensation is received with cer-
tainty while the future claimants' compensation is subject to risk.0 Thus,
the unadjusted capital markets approach is unfair to future claimants. How-
ever, the certainty equivalent approach can be combined with the capital
markets approach. Consistent with the capital markets approach, all claim-
ants will receive shares in a fund that will pay out its resources after all
claims have been realized. Instead of awarding one share in the tort instru-
ment for each dollar of liquidated claims to all present and future claimants,
the certainty equivalent approach suggests that present claimants receive a
discounted number of shares to reflect the fact that their payoff from selling
shares is less risky than the one faced by future claimants. Therefore, pre-
scenario, trustees of the annuity would not simply award annual payments pro rata on the basis of the
individual's damages. Instead, the annual payments would be further adjusted to account for past re-
ceipts. For example, if future claims exceed expectations, then an early claimant's annual shares in the
variable annuity should be devalued with respect to a late-arriving claimant with an identical number of
shares. The devaluation reflects the fact that the early claimant's shares were effectively overvalued in
the early years of the variable annuity, as the payments did not reflect the true value of total claims. Al-
though not mentioned by Roe, this proposal is very much in the spirit of his variable annuity approach.
In addition, it presumably would not violate the right of repose since no money would be "taken back"
from future claimants.
206 Awarding lump-sum has some countervailing benefits. For a discussion, see Rea, supra note
94.
207 The variable annuity payments for present claimants in later years are adjusted downwards if fu-
ture claims prove unexpectedly large.
208 This conclusion assumes that risk in the number of future claims does not covary with the mar-
ket portfolio, a seemingly reasonable presumption. At a minimum, it is likely that market participants
are less averse to the future claimants risk than are the future claimants themselves.
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sent claimants should receive less than one share in the tort instrument for
each dollar in claims. 2°9 This amalgam of the certainty equivalent and capi-
tal market approaches preserves the advantages of the capital markets ap-
proach-the reliance on the efficient information processing capabilities of
the market-while ensuring that present and future claimants receive fair
treatment.
Thus, the certainty equivalent approach can be combined effectively
with both the Roe and Smith proposals to allocate risk more evenly between
present and future claimants. However, the present versus future claimants
risk allocation is not the only distribution of risk undertaken during a mass
tort bankruptcy. Bankruptcy procedures must also ensure a fair allocation
of risk between claimants and other creditors-a subject to which we now
turn.
IV. RISK DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN CLAIMANTS AND OTHER
CREDITORS
To this point, we have focused on the allocation of risk and return be-
tween present and future claimants. In reality, of course, this is an over-
simplification. Tort claimants will seldom be the only creditors of a
bankrupt firm. Instead, present and future claimants must share the assets
of a bankrupt firm with other creditors, such as bondholders or trade credi-
tors.
Allocation of risk to future tort claimants with respect to other creditors
presents several novel issues in a bankruptcy context. First, the future
claims risk is an unusual form of risk. Ordinary bankruptcies allocate a dif-
ferent type of risk-the performance risk of the reorganized firm.1 ° While
bankruptcy courts and negotiators have experience allocating this type of
risk, the prospect of future claims is a novel risk. As a result, the risk in fu-
ture claims is more likely to be allocated unfairly or inefficiently. In addi-
tion, normal bankruptcy risk allocations are determined by knowing parties.
If one party is particularly risk-averse, it can bargain for the receipt of a less
risky claim (such as debt) in the reorganized firm. Future claimants, by
contrast, are not present at bankruptcy negotiations and therefore cannot
bargain for a desirable risk allocation.
209 Alternatively, it may be possible to adjust the number of shares received by future claimants to
reflect the risks bome by future claimants. However, given the difficulty in establishing a liquid market
for tort instruments this strategy appears less attractive because it would complicate trading in the tort
instrument, further discouraging potential market participants from becoming involved in the market.
210 The profits of a reorganized firm, like the profits of all firms, are subject to risk. By allocating
debt claims and equity claims in the reorganized firm, bankruptcy negotiations allocate this performance
risk. Equityholders have riskier claims than debtholders. In return for the added risk, equity claims gen-
erally have higher returns. For a discussion of the relative risk of debt and equity claims, see
GRINBLATT & TITMAN, supra note 162; see also Roe, supra note 5, at 876-78 (discussing conventional
bankruptcy solutions to the disparity problem in the context of mass tort bankruptcies).
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The discussion in this section concerns only the allocation of post-
bankruptcy risks. As a result, it is analytically distinct from discussions on
the appropriate priority ranking of tort claimants with respect to other credi-
tors. As explained in detail in Part IV.D, it is possible to allocate post-
bankruptcy risks optimally while respecting the existing priority structure of
the firm's creditors. t '
A. Risk Preferences and Allocations to Future Claimants and Other
Creditors
1. Risk Preferences of Future Claimants.-Because future claimants
can not specify their risk preferences during bankruptcy negotiations, bank-
ruptcy procedures should attempt to replicate the risk allocation that would
have occurred had future claimants been able to participate in the negotia-
tions. To accomplish this aim, the risk preferences of future claimants with
respect to other creditors must be analyzed."'
We believe that future claimants will be more risk-averse than other
creditors for several reasons. Future claimants may be severely injured.
These injuries may deplete the claimants' wealth and potentially require
significant new expenditures."' As discussed above,2 14 less wealthy indi-
viduals tend to be more risk-averse. This observation appears relevant for
future claimants. It is unlikely that a future claimant, who may need funds
to satisfy basic needs, will be willing to make risky bets.
Another reason to suspect that future claimants will be particularly
risk-averse to future claims risk is their inability to diversify. An example
helps illustrate this possibility. First, suppose that awards to future claim-
211 As a result, this discussion of risk allocation and risk preferences is distinct from the academic
debates over loss-allocation in bankruptcy. For example, some scholars have asserted that bankruptcy
distributions should be determined according to the creditor's ability to handle the risk of the debtor's
bankruptcy. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 790-93 (1987).
Other scholars have rejected this analysis and claim that bankruptcy allocations should conform to non-
bankruptcy rights. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A
Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 815, 822-23 (1987). These arguments about risk and loss distribu-
tion are strictly from a pre-bankruptcy perspective, i.e., they discuss the ability of various bankruptcy
parties to anticipate bankruptcies and diversify away from the risk of bankruptcy. The discussion in this
paper, however, focuses on post-bankruptcy risk preferences. That is, the insolvency of a firm is ac-
cepted as a given. This Article simply seeks to determine how to allocate post-bankruptcy risks (such as
the risk in future claims) to best accord with supposed post-bankruptcy risk preferences. Whatever the
position one takes on loss distribution and the resultant bankruptcy priorities, one can still believe that
post-bankruptcy risk (as opposed to value) should be allocated efficiently. For further details, see the
discussion of value and risk bankruptcy priorities discussed below infra Part IV.D.
212 In this section, the term "other creditors" will refer primarily to contract creditors and not pre-
sent tort claimants.
213 This argument supposes that future claimants are incompletely insured. This appears to be a
reasonable assumption. While medical expenditures may be covered by insurance, it is highly unlikely
that lost earnings that result from the injury will be completely insured.
214 See the discussion in Part II1.Al.
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ants are funded from a settlement fund that has a fixed value (in accord with
current practice). Suppose also that a given future claimant will definitely
be injured, but is not sure about the size of the injury. The injury's value
can be either high or low. If the future claimant's injury turns out to be
high, then this suggests that the effects of mass tort exposure are worse than
expected. In this scenario, it is likely that there are a higher than expected
number of other future claimants and that other future claimants also re-
ceive a greater than expected injury. As a result, the first future claimant
will have to share the fixed-value future claimants' settlement fund with a
greater number of others, reducing the size of the award for the first future
claimant as a percentage of her total claim. This is an undesirable state of
affairs. When the future claimant is badly injured and has the greatest need
for money, the amount available to compensate her is at its smallest. When
her injury is low, by contrast, there will be fewer other claims to share with;
she will be able to recoup a greater percentage of her injury from the fund-
in spite of the fact that her needs are not particularly great.
Present claimants will also have a higher level of risk aversion than
other creditors. Present claimants are severely injured and therefore pre-
sumably quite risk-averse. The diversification problem, however, should
cause fewer problems for present claimants. If present claimants are paid
immediately, then compensation is no longer correlated with the size of
their injury (unlike the case for future claimants). However, when injuries
develop over time and a deferred compensation scheme for present claim-
ants is adopted (such as Roe's variable annuity approach), present claimants
will also be under-diversified. If the injuries of present claimants become
unexpectedly severe, then their deferred compensation is likely to be
smaller as other claimants may also be suffering worse than expected inju-
ries.
2. Allocating Risk Between Present Claimants, Future Claimants,
and Other Creditors.--Correlation between individuals' claims
strongly suggests that future claimants (and, to a lesser degree, present
claimants) should not bear the risk of future claims. The size of future
claimants' injuries will be correlated with the size of their award. This cor-
relation suggests a lack of diversification as future claimants "have all their
eggs in one basket." By contrast, contract creditors are less exposed to the
future claims risk. Their need for funds is unlikely to depend upon the re-
alization of future claims because the creditors are uninjured. Even if con-
tract creditors are also risk-averse with respect to the future claims risk, it is
highly unlikely that they will share the same degree of risk aversion as the
undiversified future claimants.
If future claimants participated in bankruptcy negotiations, they would
express a greater aversion to future claims risk than other creditors. Future
claimants would be willing to accept a lower average return in exchange for
diversification away from the risk in future claims. But future claimants do
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not participate in bankruptcy negotiations. Nevertheless, bankruptcy out-
comes should reflect their risk preferences, implying that future claims risk
should be awarded to other creditors to the greatest extent possible. Fur-
thermore, present claimants would also prefer to avoid exposure to future
claims risk in exchange for a reduced average return. Because present
claimants participate in negotiations, there is less of a need to construct pro-
cedures to ensure that they receive their preferred risk allocation. Neverthe-
less, present claimants (or their representatives) are unlikely to be
experienced or sophisticated bankruptcy negotiators." 5 As a result, any
outcome that allocates future claims risk to present claimants should be
greeted with skepticism.
As recognized by Roe, the future claims risk is not the only risk allo-
cated in a mass tort bankruptcy.216 The performance risk of the reorganized
firm must also be allocated. Tort claimants will tend to be more averse to
holding this risk than other creditors. When the need for funds is great (as
in the case of tort claimants), the individual's willingness to hold risky se-
curities decreases. As a result, bankruptcy settlements should also allocate
as much of the firm risk to contract creditors as possible. The obvious
method of achieving this allocation is to award tort claimants debt claims
on the reorganized firm while awarding equity claims to the other creditors.
Roe recognized, however, that tort claimants can not be compensated en-
tirely with debt, as this would impose a crushing debt burden upon the reor-
ganized firm.27
Thus, tort claimants, and in particular future tort claimants, are likely
to be more risk-averse than other creditors. In response, mass tort bank-
ruptcies should minimize the risk exposure of claimants relative to contract
creditors-potentially by awarding the contract creditors riskier claims with
higher expected returns. We will now compare actual mass tort bankruptcy
performance with this standard.
B. Risk Allocation to Claimants and Other Creditors in Previous Mass
Tort Bankruptcies
It should come as no surprise to the reader that mass tort bankruptcy
settlements have generally allocated a considerable amount of risk to future
claimants with respect to other creditors. Again, the Manville settlement is
illustrative."t The settlement allocated all of the risk in future claims to fu-
215 Because it is unlikely that present claimants' representatives share the same risk preferences as
the claimants themselves, present claimants are likely to leave bankruptcy with an undesirable risk allo-
cation. For a discussion of conflicts of interest in risk allocation between future claimants and their rep-
resentatives, see Part IV.C.2.
216 See Roe, supra note 5, at 876-79.
217 Id. at 876.
218 For a description of the settlement terms with respect to contract creditors, see In re Johns-
Manville Co., 68 B.R. 618, 633-34 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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ture claimants. Both contract creditors and present claimants received
100% of their claims; their payouts were not contingent upon the realization
of future claims. For example, general unsecured Manville creditors re-
ceived cash and debt securities equal to 100% of the value of their claims." 9
Neither the value of the notes nor the value of cash was contingent upon the
size of future claims. The settlement also intended for future claimants to
receive 100% of the value on their claims. The value of the future claim-
ants' compensation, however, depended upon the size of future claims. Be-
cause the value of the assets assigned to the fund for future claimants was
fixed, the amount received by each claimant depended upon the total
amount of future claims.22°
This outcome was unfair to future claimants along a number of dimen-
sions. First, as previously discussed, the court's estimates do not appear to
have been accurately calculated.2t  As a result, future claimants were
unlikely to receive full compensation, even if the size of future claims was
equal to expectations. Second, future claimants' claims were riskier than
those held by other creditors; while other creditors received a guaranteed,
riskless return, the claims of future claimants were subject to the possibility
of diminution should aggregate future claims exceed expectations. Gener-
ally, riskier claims should receive a possibility for higher expected return.
There is no hint in the Manville settlement description, however, that future
claimants might have received more than 100% of their claims, had aggre-
gate future claims fallen short of expectations. 23
Even if future claimants had received fair market value for their ex-
pected claims, the settlement would still have done a poor job of risk alloca-
tion. Future claimants are risk-averse and undiversified. This reality means
that the market value of risky securities is greater than the personal value of
such securities to future claimants. If future claimants could act for them-
selves, they would sell the securities on the market. But ill-defined future
claimants are unable to act for themselves. As a result, bankruptcy settle-
ments should seek to award securities to future claimants that would appeal
to extremely risk-averse individuals. By allocating risky securities to future
claimants, the Manville settlement failed this task. Similarly, following re-
organization, risk in Manville's future performance was poorly allocated.
Equity claims on a firm are riskier than debt claims.224 Risk-averse future
claimants would generally exhibit a greater preference for debt than the av-
219 id. at 633.
220 See the discussion in Part I1I.B.2.
221 See supra Part II.A.
222 This is the "fair distribution problem" that was the focus of Smith's article, supra note 2, as well
as the focus of the contingency fee approach discussed in Part II.
223 See In re Johns-Manville, 68 B.R. at 630-35 (failing to mention the possibility that future claim-
ants could receive more than 100% of their claims). This topic is the focus of analysis in Part 1II.
224 See MALKIEL, supra note 143, at 31 tbl.I.2 (showing that the standard deviation of annual re-
turns for stocks is higher than that for bonds).
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erage creditor or market participant. As a result, future claimants should
hold as much debt as possible in a reorganized firm."' The Manville set-
tlement did just the opposite. The Manville settlement trust fund for future
claimants included approximately $5 billion in assets.226 At least $2.3 bil-
lion of this sum consisted of equity in the reorganized Manville Corporation
and claims on future Manville profits.227 Other creditors, by contrast, re-
ceived all of their disbursements from the bankruptcy negotiation in the
form of low-risk cash or notes.228
Post-Manville mass tort bankruptcies share these flaws. For example,
the settlement plan of the Dow Coming breast-implant-related mass tort
bankruptcy capped Dow Coming's liability. 229 Thus, claimants were fully
exposed to the future claims risk because the cap was not adjustable if fu-
ture claims should exceed expectations. Bankruptcy reorganizations have
also exposed risk-averse future claimants to firm performance risk. The
UNR Industries bankruptcy, for example, created a trust for future claim-
ants that was almost entirely funded by risky equity in the reorganized
company.30 Yet again, risk-averse future claimants were exposed to risks
as a result of their absence. Such claimants might have been willing to of-
fer a premium in order to avoid such risks, had they been present.
The FAIR Act creates a trust fund that shares these flaws. The risk that
future claims will exceed expectations is bome by future claimants. As
Senator Patrick Leahy described the FAIR Act trust fund:
[T]his bill shifts the financial risk from defendants and insurers to victims.
The bill guarantees businesses a lifetime of absolute legal and financial cer-
tainty, but it leaves asbestos victims completely out of luck if the trust fund
runs out of money at any time in the next 50 years. The one constant in our
experience with projections of asbestos liabilities is that the projections of to-
day will be wrong tomorrow. Twenty years ago, all the experts predicted that
the Manville Trust Fund would be paying asbestos victims full compensation
for many years. Now, asbestos victims get five cents on the dollar because the
Manville Trust Fund is nearly insolvent. The risk of insolvency, and indeed
the risk of inadequate funding short of insolvency, in a national trust fund must
225 This suggestion was adumbrated in Roe, supra note 5, at 878-80.
226 Smith, supra note 2, at 368.
227 The Manville Trust received 80% of the equity in the reorganized Manville, as well as a claim
on 20% of the firm's profits after a certain date. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710,
752-53 (Bankr. E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991). In addition, the fund held cash and debt worth approximately $2.7
billion. Because the total value of the fund was approximated at $5 billion, Smith, supra note 2, at 368,
the value of the equity can be estimated as $5 billion - $2.7 billion = $2.3 billion.
228 See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville, 68 B.R. at 634 (noting that unsecured creditors received cash
and debt in the reorganized Manville).
229 See GIBSON, supra note 17, at 5.
230 See id. at 172.
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be addressed in order to provide certainty to asbestos victims as well as to de-
fendants and insurers. 3
C. Reallocating Risk Away from Future Claimants
Previous mass tort bankruptcy settlements have failed to achieve effi-
cient risk allocation. Indeed, such settlements have even failed to recognize
or comment on the risk-distributional aspects of settlement plans.232 Bank-
ruptcy courts appear to believe that future claimants must inevitably bear
the risk in future claims if firms are to be protected from the value-crushing
effects of future tort liabilities. This view is misguided. The future claims
risk may be shared amongst all creditors or it may be allocated to those
creditors best able to bear the risk (either approach may be used to free the
reorganized firm from the burden of future claims). Similarly, bankruptcy
courts have overlooked the importance of the risk level of the assets that
fund future claimants' compensation. These facts suggest that mass tort
bankruptcy practice can be improved by focusing on the allocation of risk
to various classes of claimants.
1. Roe's Proposal.-Roe's early paper offered a fascinating analysis
of some of these issues.233 Recognizing that tort claimants are more risk-
averse than other creditors, 3 ' Roe proposed that they should be exposed to a
minimum amount of firm-performance risk.2 35 Roe also noted a counter-
vailing factor that would prevent claimants from receiving claims that were
overwhelmingly composed of debt: the risk of subsequent bankruptcy." If
tort claimants' claims comprise a significant percentage of total claims on
the bankrupt firm, then it will be difficult to award tort claimants debt
claims. Too many outstanding debt claims might put the firm in treacher-
ous financial straits-the very outcome that mass tort bankruptcies are de-
signed to avoid. As a result, Roe calls for a "balance" between reducing
tort claimants' exposure to risk and protecting the reorganized firm from fi-
nancial pressure.237
Roe's proposal is a definite improvement over current practice. It can
potentially protect future claimants from an undesirable amount of firm-
231 See, e.g., Hearings on Asbestos Litigation, supra note 14, at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
print testimony.cfm?id=777&wit id=50 (testimony of Senator Patrick Leahy).
232 When discussing the value and fairness of the claims received by future claimants, courts have
seldom recognized the risk level of claims as an important consideration. See, e.g., In re Johns-
Manville, 68 B.R. at 632-36 (ignoring the risk level of future claims when discussing the efficacy of the
Manville settlement). To our knowledge, this section constitutes the first systematic analysis of risk al-
locations in actual mass tort bankruptcies.
233 See Roe, supra note 5, at 874-79.
234 Id. at 877-78.
235 See id.
236 See id. at 876.
237 Id. at 878.
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performance risk. Nevertheless, Roe's suggestions are incomplete. While
Roe acknowledges the existence of future claims risk in addition to firm-
performance risk, his "debt" suggestion only "protects" future claimants
from firm-performance risk. In effect, Roe proposes that future claimants'
trust funds hold low-risk assets to the greatest extent possible. Thus, if the
reorganized firm's performance falls short of expectations, future claimants
should not suffer much loss of compensation (in contrast to the compensa-
tion of equity-holding creditors). Roe's proposal leaves future claimants
exposed to the risk in future claims, however. If future claims prove unex-
pectedly high, future claimants' compensation will suffer (and not the com-
pensation of other creditors). Because the risks in the size of future claims
may be even larger than the risks in firm performance,238 future claimants
remain exposed to undesirable amounts of risk.
2. Risk Allocation and Percentage-Fee Compensation for Future
Claimants' Representatives.-The percentage-fee approach rec-
ommended in Part II will help mitigate, but not eliminate, the risk-
distributional biases that currently plague mass tort bankruptcies. To
briefly review, the percentage-fee approach called for FCRs to receive a
percentage of the future claimants' total compensation. This approach en-
sures that the FCR's incentives are aligned with the goals of future claim-
ants: higher compensation for future claimants translates into a greater fee
for the FCR.
A percentage-fee approach would encourage the FCR to eliminate un-
compensated risk bearing for future claimants. Currently, claimants are
sometimes placed in circumstances where they experience "downside" risk
but no upside reward.239 Because FCRs receive a percentage of future
claimants' claims, they will refuse to accept these "no upside" securities as
adequate compensation for future claimants. Instead, the FCRs will have an
incentive to obtain compensation for this risk-bearing by future claimants.
FCRs might demand, for example, that future claimants should be able to
obtain more than 100% compensation in some cases to "compensate" them
for the chance that their compensation might be far less than 100% if future
claims exceed expectations. The FCRs' demands will be reinforced by
their ability to vote on behalf of future claimants with respect to reorganiza-
tion plans and by pointing out the inherent unfairness of uncompensated
risk-bearing to the judge.
The percentage-fee approach is no panacea, however. While FCRs
may ensure that future claimants are compensated for bearing risk, they will
not strive to achieve the future claimants' ideal risk allocation. Even if fu-
ture claimants receive the market rate for bearing a given amount of risk,
this does not imply that future claimants would choose to bear this risk. Fu-
238 See supra text accompanying note 60.
239 See, e.g., description of the Dow-Coming bankruptcy in the text accompanying note 229.
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ture claimants are exceedingly risk-averse and will probably be willing to
pay an above-market premium to avoid risk. FCRs, by contrast, are proba-
bly less risk-averse than future claimants. FCRs have not been injured and
therefore have a less pressing need for guaranteed income. Furthermore,
FCRs may be able to diversify their investments. If FCRs are members of
plaintiffs' law firms, for example, then they may share their fees with the
rest of the firm and in turn receive a diverse stream of income from a vari-
ety of legal activities. An FCR in this position will not share the future
claimants' desire to avoid risk. As a result, an FCR under such conditions
may seek to obtain risky returns for future claimants, so long as the risks are
compensated at the market rate. For example, FCRs may be far more will-
ing than future claimants to hold (properly priced) risky equity in the reor-
ganized firm. As a result, FCRs may vote for plans that allocate equity to
future claimants in spite of the fact that such plans may provide undesirable
security from the future claimants' perspective.
Thus, the percentage-fee approach does not perfectly align the incen-
tives of FCRs and future claimants.24 ° FCRs and future claimants will
probably have disparate levels of risk aversion. Some modifications of the
percentage-fee approach, however, may give FCRs a greater incentive to
consider the future claimants' degree of risk aversion. One potential modi-
fication of the percentage-fee approach would involve a "sliding scale" per-
centage fee.24' Rather than awarding FCRs a fixed percentage of future
claimants' compensation, the courts could insist that the percentage should
go down as the amount of claims goes up. If the sliding scale were appro-
priately designed, this compensation scheme would ensure that the FCRs
(acting in their own self-interest) prefer averages to extremes. FCRs would
thus seek to reduce the risk exposure of future claimants.
An example is illustrative. Suppose that a risk-neutral percentage-fee-
compensated FCR has two choices for future claimants' compensation. In
the first option, the future claimants would receive $10,000 with certainty.
In the second option, the future claimants will receive $5000 or $16,000
with equal probability (for an expected value of $10,500). Although the
second option has a higher expected value, assume that risk-averse future
claimants prefer the first option because it is less risky. Suppose that the
FCR is compensated at a fixed rate of 10%. Under these circumstances, the
risk-neutral FCR will choose the second option because it will pay her an
average of $1050 per claimant while the first option will only pay an aver-
age of $1000. Thus, the FCR compensated by a fixed percentage does not
choose the future claimants' preferred option because she has a different
level of risk-tolerance. Now, however, suppose that the FCR is given a
240 In spite of this imperfection, the percentage-fee approach does a considerably better job of
aligning the representatives' interests with those of future claimants than other proposals. See Part II.C.
241 Mathematically, a sliding scale fee means that an FCR's compensation is a concave function of
the amount received by future claimants.
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sliding scale percentage fee. She receives 10% of the first $10,000 received
by a given future claimant, but only 5% of any remaining compensation re-
ceived by future claimants. Under the sliding scale approach, the first op-
tion would again yield the FCR $1000 per claimant. The second option will
now yield an average of $900 per claimant. 42 Under the sliding scale ap-
proach, the FCR will prefer the first option to the second option. Thus, the
sliding scale percentage fee does a superior job of aligning the interests of
FCRs with those of risk-averse future claimants. When the uncertainties
surrounding future claimants are great and future claimants are likely to be
risk-averse, the sliding scale approach is likely to offer significant gains
over a fixed percentage-fee approach.
Another approach will similarly improve the FCR's incentives to
achieve an optimal risk allocation for future claimants. Instead of compen-
sating the FCR based on a percentage of the pool of funds set aside for fu-
ture claimants, the FCR's compensation could be based on the average
percentage recovery of a future claimant.
A simple example will best illustrate the distinction between this aver-
age recovery method and the percentage-of-funds method. Suppose that,
instead of giving the FCR 1% of the total awards paid to future claimants,
the FCR's compensation is set at $1 million multiplied by the average per-
centage recovery of the future claimant. Suppose also that the FCR is able
to negotiate for $1 billion to be set aside for future claimants, but the
amount of future claims, realized in twenty years, could be $1 billion or $2
billion with equal probability. In the first scenario, the recovery of a future
claimant would be 100%, since a dollar of funds is available for each dollar
of claims, and the FCR would receive a payment of $1 million. In the sec-
ond scenario, a future claimant would only recover 50%, since there are two
dollars of claims for every dollar in the trust. The FCR would then receive
50% of $1 million, or $500,000. While the FCR's expected compensation
in this example is $750,000 (the simple average of $1 million and
$500,000), the FCR will value this risky claim at less than $750,000 if she
is risk-averse. Aware that the uncertainty surrounding future claims will af-
fect both her welfare and that of the future claimants she represents, the
FCR will then have the proper incentive to seek more compensation for fu-
ture claimants when this uncertainty is greater. She will also have the in-
centive to use the appropriate means necessary to shield future claimants
from risk, since she will be shielding her own payment from risk in the
process.
Using this approach would have two advantages relative to the simpler
percentage-of-funds approach. First, as we have already mentioned, this
approach better aligns the incentives of the FCR and future claimant, since
242 If each future claimant receives $5000, then the FCR will receive $500 per claimant. If each fu-
ture claimant receives $16,000, than the FCR will receive .1 * $10,000 + .05 * $6000 = $1300. Because
both possibilities are equally likely, the FCR receives an average fee of $900 per claimant.
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the compensation scheme is automatically adjusted for risk. If there is more
uncertainty about the severity of future claims, all else being equal, the
FCR's compensation will be riskier as well, leading her to seek compensa-
tion for bearing this risk. Second, the procedure provides an easier mecha-
nism for limiting the FCR's compensation to a reasonable level without
affecting her incentives to secure funds for future claimants. If the percent-
age-of-funds approach is used, the bankruptcy judge would need to select
both an FCR and a percentage fee based on sparse information. It would be
unwise to choose a standard percentage, such as 1%, since the size of trust
funds may vary considerably from firm to firm. Similarly, as mentioned
earlier, it would be unwise to revise an FCR's compensation after negotia-
tions have concluded to reach a "reasonable" amount because knowledge
that such an adjustment will occur ex post affects the FCR's incentive to se-
cure more funds for future claimants. The average recovery method allows
the judge to peg the FCR's compensation to a reasonable level at the begin-
ning of the procedure (in the example above, the judge would be certain that
the FCR would never receive more than $1 million) without any knowledge
of the magnitude of future claims and without distorting her incentives to
negotiate for future claimants vigorously.
When the uncertainties surrounding future claimants are great and fu-
ture claimants are likely to be risk-averse, the sliding scale and average per-
centage-fee approaches are likely to offer significant gains over a fixed-
percentage-fee approach. Bankruptcy judges and policymakers should im-
plement the procedure that proves most transparent and workable.
D. Allocating Future Claims Risk to Contract Creditors: The "Risk
Priority" Approach
The sliding scale and average percentage recovery approaches offer a
superior alignment of incentives between FCRs and future claimants. This
means little, however, if FCRs do not have a mechanism for reducing future
claimants' risk exposure. This section examines two procedures for reduc-
ing the future claimants' exposure to risk.
1. Existing Proposals for Shielding Future Claimants from Future
Claims Risk-One existing method of reducing future claimants'
exposure to future claims risk involves the purchase of insurance. Future
claimants would be willing to pay a premium to have an insurer bear the
risk of future claims. As a result, the FCR should carefully explore and
consider insurance options.243 Nevertheless, as discussed in Part III.B.5, in-
surance is likely to be both prohibitively expensive as well as incomplete.2"
243 Because insurance premiums are likely to be high, relatively risk-neutral FCRs are unlikely to
purchase insurance if they are compensated on a percentage-fee basis. See supra text accompanying
notes 173-180. As a result, the sliding scale approach will be particularly important for encouraging
FCRs to pay the necessary premiums to acquire at least some insurance.
244 See supra text accompanying notes 173-180.
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Adverse selection problems and the size and uncertainty of the claims pre-
vent insurance from offering an adequate solution. Even risk-averse future
claimants will not be willing to pay the exorbitant premiums that would be
demanded by insurance companies to bear the entire future claims risk.
Someone must bear the future claims risk, however. Incomplete insur-
ance markets are not a reason to allocate the future claims risk to future
claimants. Contract creditors of the bankrupt firm are likely to be less risk-
averse than the future claimants. Consequently, contract creditors should
bear the future claims risk. A contract creditor's return should fluctuate
with the size of future claims, while future claimants' compensation should
be shielded from these fluctuations to the greatest possible extent.
The simplest way to shield future claimants from the future claims risk
would be to give tort claimants priority over other creditors.245 For exam-
ple, suppose that a firm's assets exceeded the value of tort claimants' claims
under any eventuality (including an unexpectedly high future claims value).
Suppose further that the firm's assets fell short of the combined value of
tort claimants' and contract creditors' claims. Under these circumstances,
absolute priority relative to all other creditors shields future claimants from
risk; all tort claimants (present and future) will be fully compensated re-
gardless of the size of future claims. 46 If future claimants share priority
with other creditors, however, then future claimants will be exposed to the
future claims risk. When future claims exceed expectations, future claim-
ants, like other creditors, receive less than full compensation. Thus, abso-
lute priority shields future claimants from risk.
However, awarding tort claimants absolute priority is a very blunt
method of protecting risk-averse future claimants. Many considerations,
including pre-bankruptcy state law, determine the existing priority structure
amongst creditors.247 Restructuring priority to protect future claimants from
risk may have unforeseen consequences, such as restricting corporations'
access to credit or reducing the incentive for corporations to file for bank-
ruptcy. Furthermore, existing bankruptcy practice suggests that future
claimants will be the default party to assume the risk of future claims. Ab-
solute priority for tort claimants may not change this practice. Instead,
245 Currently, tort claimants share priority with unsecured creditors and have lower priority than se-
cured creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2000) (stating that classes of unsecured creditors entitled to prior-
ity do not include tort claimants); 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)-(b) (2000) (stating that holders of "allowed
unsecured claims" who are not entitled to priority pursuant to II U.S.C. § 507 share pro rata in remain-
ing assets of bankrupt firm). Several commentators have suggested that tort claimants be awarded prior-
ity over all other claimants. See, e.g., David Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1643-44 (1991) (offering several reasons why tort claimants should receive pri-
ority with respect to other creditors).
246 This assumes that distributions to contract creditors will be delayed until the size of future
claims becomes clear. For a discussion of a proposal along these lines, see infra text accompanying
notes 250-253.
247 See Baird, supra note 211, at 822-23.
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higher priority for tort claimants may simply increase the average compen-
sation value received by tort claimants while maintaining the existing (un-
favorable) allocation of risk. As a result, a more precise method of
reducing future claimants' exposure to future claims risk is desirable.
2. "Risk" Priority: A Low-Impact Means of Shielding Future
Claimants from Future Claims Risk.-To shield tort claimants
from future claims risk while preserving the existing bankruptcy priority
structure, we first distinguish between the conventional definition of prior-
ity and "risk" priority. Traditional bankruptcy priority refers to the division
of value between creditors in bankruptcy. For example, the traditional "pro
rata sharing rule" specifies that creditors with identical priority levels
should receive value in the bankrupt firm on a pro rata basis if there are in-
sufficient assets to pay all the creditors of that priority level in full. To il-
lustrate, suppose that there are two general unsecured creditors, one
(creditor A) with a claim for $40 million and another (creditor B) with a
claim for $60 million. Suppose that there are $50 million in assets available
to distribute to general unsecured creditors. The traditional pro rata rule
implies that creditor A should receive assets worth
$20M = $40M * $50M, while creditor B should receive claims
$40M + $60M
worth $30M = * $50M. Risk priority, by contrast, refers
$40M + $60M
to the division of risk between creditors. Risk priority takes the division of
value between creditors as given. Given these values, the risk priority
structure determines how to apportion the risk level of claims. Awarding
one creditor risk priority implies that the creditor should receive low-risk
claims relative to another creditor. Returning to the above example, sup-
pose that the reorganized firm will be issuing debt with a market value of
$20 million and equity with a market value of $30 million. Suppose further
that creditor A has been awarded risk priority. This priority would imply
that creditor A should receive all of the debt claims on the reorganized firm
while creditor B should receive the equity claims. Note that risk priority
does not affect traditional priority. Both A ($20 million in debt) and B ($30
million in equity) receive securities with market values that equal the re-
spective values specified by the pro rata sharing rule. In the absence of risk
priority, risk is distributed differently between creditors A and B. If risk as
well as value is distributed evenly between creditors A and B, then A
should receive debt with a market value of $8 million and equity with a
value of $12 million while B receives $12 million in debt and $18 million
in equity. Risk priority for A therefore reduces the risk level of A's return
by increasing the amount of low-risk debt received by A. In ordinary bank-
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ruptcies, the notion of risk priority will have reduced relevance because all
claimants can bargain for the claims-risk level that they prefer or sell their
claims in the market. If creditor A is more risk-averse than creditor B for
example, then they may agree to allocate all the debt in the reorganized firm
to A even without any risk priority for A.
In mass tort bankruptcies, by contrast, risk priority assumes heightened
relevance. If risk-averse (tort) creditor A cannot bargain to acquire the less
risky assets or sell assets with an undesirable amount of risk to a more will-
ing risk bearer, then bankruptcy settlements may allocate risk ineffi-
ciently.248 Risk priority helps prevent this possibility. Just as bankruptcy
judges currently evaluate settlements to determine if they accord with tradi-
tional priority,249 so too should bankruptcy judges in mass tort bankruptcies
evaluate settlements with respect to conformance with risk priority.
We propose that tort claimants (and in particular future claimants) re-
ceive risk priority. Because tort claimants are extremely risk-averse and are
unlikely to be able to specify their risk preferences in bankruptcy, bank-
ruptcy courts should ensure that they receive low-risk compensation by
awarding them risk priority. Risk priority for tort claimants implies that
contract creditors (including secured creditors) will bear as much of the fu-
ture claims and firm-performance risk as possible. This approach will pro-
tect tort claimants from their inherent disadvantages in bankruptcy
negotiations."' Risk priority will not harm contract creditors, however, be-
cause the market value of their securities should accord with the values
specified by the traditional priority structure.
Effective adherence to risk priority for tort claimants will require some
creativity. New securities must be designed that will enable risk to be allo-
cated to contract creditors rather than tort claimants. Although this innova-
tion may be difficult, such an approach is preferable to the current default
position of allocating the risk to late-arriving future claimants.
One possibility is to create a fund analogous to Smith's capital markets
approach fund."' The fund will be backed with assets from the bankrupt
firm and will pay out the value of these assets at a future point after the size
248 In general, the benefits of risk priority specification will be highest when discrete groups of
claimants have disparate risk preferences and an inability to bargain to obtain securities that conform to
their risk preferences.
249 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2000). For a brief description of priority rules, see supra notes 35 and
142.
250 Indeed, risk priority will reduce the need to align the FCR's risk incentives with those of future
claimants. So long as bankruptcy judges ensure that risk priority is enforced, an FCR will not have to
focus on risk allocation to claimants and can instead focus on value allocation.
251 Smith discusses the possibility" of issuing shares in a trust fund to contract creditors as well as
tort claimants. Smith, supra note 2, at 420-22. These shares would be paid out in accord with ex ante
priority, however. Thus, future claimants will be exposed to the same degree of risk as unsecured con-
tract creditors, making for an inefficient risk allocation. Awarding shares in accordance with risk prior-
ity, by contrast, reduces tort claimants' exposure to risk.
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of future claims has been fully determined. If future claims exceed expecta-
tions, the value of a share in the fund will be low, while if future claims fall
short of expectations, the value of a share in the fund will be high. Rather
than awarding shares in this fund to tort claimants, as proposed by Smith,
the shares should be awarded to contract creditors. The number of shares
awarded to contract creditors should be determined by the priority rankings
of the various shareholders. This will enable the contract creditors to bear
the risk of future claims.
An example can help illustrate the effects of risk priority as well as the
workings of a future claimants' fund. Suppose that a tort-feasing firm has
$4 million in assets. Suppose also, for simplicity, that contract creditors and
other market participants are risk-neutral with respect to future claims
risk.2 Suppose further that all claimants are future claimants and that each
future claimant will suffer a $100,000 injury. The number of future claim-
ants is uncertain, however, and can be either twenty or one-hundred with
equal probability. Thus, the expected value of future tort claims is $6 mil-
lion.253 Unsecured creditors, who share value pro rata with tort claimants
also hold $6 million in claims. The pro rata rule states that the tort claim-
ants and the unsecured creditors should each receive claims worth
$6M * $4M = $2M.
$6M+$6M
Consider the following proposal. Allocate all $4 million in assets to a
fund, award unsecured creditors one share in the fund for each dollar in
claims, and have the fund pay $33,333 to each future claimant. The
$33,333 figure was chosen to ensure that claimants and unsecured creditors
share value according to the pro rata rule. After all future claimants have
come forward, the fund will award its remaining assets to the unsecured
creditors according to the number of shares they have in the fund.
The payoff to future claimants and creditors will be as follows. If only
twenty future claimants come forward, then the fund will award a total of
20*$33,333=$.666M to future claimants. Thus, the fund will have $4M -
$.666M=$3.333M remaining for contract creditors after all the future claim-
ants have come forward. Contract creditors do very well when future
claims fall short of expectations. They recover more than half of their $6M
in total claims. If one-hundred future claimants come forward, however,
then the situation changes. The fund will award 100*$33,333=$3.333M to
future claimants. As result, only $4M - $3.333M=$.666M will remain for
contract creditors. Contract creditors fare quite poorly when future claims
252 In reality, contract creditors will also be risk-averse. Their risk aversion will be smaller and
their ability to diversify greater than future claimants, however. The general trend of the results pre-
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exceed expectations.
This proposal and example has effectively granted future claimants risk
priority while preserving the traditional pro rata sharing between tort claim-
ants and other creditors. Both tort claimants and other creditors receive an
average of $2M from the assets of the bankruptcy firm, in accord with their
rights under the pro rata rule. Future claimants' individual recoveries are
subject to considerably less risk than individual shareholders in the contract
creditor's fund. All future claimants received $33,333 regardless of the
number of future claimants-the future claimants' payment was subject to
no risk. However, the value of a contract creditor's share in the fund is
highly dependent on the number of claimants-contract creditors received
five times as great a return when the number of future claimants was low as
when it was high. Thus, the proposal adheres to risk priority for tort claim-
ants. Risk-averse claimants bear very little risk relative to contract credi-
tors."'
Risk-averse tort claimants should also receive risk priority with respect
to secured creditors. That is, secured creditors should receive riskier claims
than tort claimants. The conventional bankruptcy priority of secured credit
will be reflected in the greater value of risky claims allocated to secured
creditors, while unsecured creditors hold debt or tort claims with a similar
face value.
Risk priority can also be applied to the asbestos trust fund created by
the FAIR Act. Indeed, this priority could be accomplished without raising
the funding requirements from insurers and asbestos producing companies.
If risk priority were to be applied to the trust fund while keeping funding
requirements constant, the compensation levels awarded to claimants would
be reduced. In turn, insurers and companies will guarantee that all claim-
ants receive the reduced compensation level. If future claims exceed expec-
tations, insurers and companies will be required to pay more to claimants
than specified by the fund (currently, the liability of insurers and other
companies is capped by the mandated size of the fund). If claims fall short
of or equal expectations, then insurers and companies will benefit because
the size of awards per claimant has been reduced. Thus, insurers and com-
panies-and not risk-averse future claimants-will bear the risk that future
claims exceed expectations. The size of the reduction in per capita pay-
ments should be chosen to ensure that companies and insurers will expect to
pay the same amount to asbestos claimants as they would have with the
creation of the capped fund (as described above).
This discussion suggests that risk priority can be reconciled with tradi-
tional notions of priority and pro rata sharing. Given the potentially large
254 In this example, claimants and other creditors receive the same average value in spite of the fact
that contract creditors bore more risk. This is the result of the assumption of risk neutrality for contract
creditors. In actuality, slightly risk-averse contract creditors will require a slightly higher average return
than future claimants to compensate them for bearing the risk.
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gains from shielding tort claimants from risk, the creation of risk priority
rights for tort claimants is an extremely desirable development.255
3. Risk Priority and the Certainty Equivalent Approach.-If risk pri-
ority is granted to tort claimants, then the importance of the certainty
equivalent approach discussed in Part III is reduced. Recall that the pur-
pose of the certainty equivalent approach was to make prospective tort
claimants indifferent between becoming present or future claimants.256 Be-
cause tort claimants are risk-averse and future tort claimants' claims are
subject to greater risk, the certainty equivalent approach implied that future
claimants should receive a premium to compensate them for the added risk.
The relevance of the certainty equivalent approach therefore depends
upon the relative risk level of present and future claimants' overall compen-
sation. Risk priority will reduce if not eliminate the disparity in risk be-
tween present and future claimants' compensation. In existing mass tort
bankruptcies, future claimants' compensation has been riskier because fu-
ture claimants were exposed to future claims risk to a greater extent than
present claimants. Risk priority, however, limits future claimants' (and pre-
sent claimants') exposure to future claims risk; the future claims risk is
borne by contract creditors who have low risk priority. As a result, both fu-
ture claimants' and present claimants' compensation is subject to minimal
risk. For example, all tort claimants received $33,333 in all cases in the risk
priority illustration presented above, implying that their compensation was
riskless. When both present and future claimants' compensation have the
same amount of risk, a prospective tort claimant will not demand a pre-
mium to be a future claimant because future claimants do not bear any extra
risk. Thus, the certainty equivalent premium should be zero. Even if the
risk priority approach reduces rather than eliminates the risk exposure dis-
parity between present and future claimants, the size of the certainty equiva-
lent premium will be greatly reduced.
Given the complexities of the certainty equivalent approach, this ob-
servation implies that the risk priority and certainty equivalent approaches
should not be adopted together. Risk priority for tort claimants obviates
much of the need for the certainty equivalent approach. In addition, risk
priority offers several improvements over the certainty equivalent approach.
With risk priority, risk is allocated efficiently between tort claimants and
contract creditors. In the certainty equivalent approach, by contrast, tort
255 Risk priority makes the contract creditors insurers of the future claimants. In spite of the in-
completeness of the insurance markets, this proposal is still feasible. Because risk priority would be de
rigueur, the contract creditors will not be subject to the adverse selection problems that would plague
insurance markets, enabling contract creditors to receive fair value for bearing the future claims risk. In
addition, the creation of risk priority would establish a new constituency in favor of the development of
mass tort insurance-the contract creditors. These creditors may be able to give greater impetus to the
development of this market than widely scattered and ill-defined present and future tort claimants.
256 See supra text accompanying notes 187-190.
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claimants bear an unnecessarily large amount of risk although the premium
prevents unequal treatment between present and future tort claimants. Fur-
thermore, risk priority helps reduce any retrospective disparities between
present and future claimants. Although the certainty equivalent approach
assures that, behind a veil of ignorance, prospective tort claimants would be
indifferent between present and future status, the retrospective disparities in
outcome may still be problematic and subject to controversy. As a result,
the risk priority approach is preferable to the certainty equivalent approach.
If the risk priority approach proves infeasible,257 however, then the certainty
equivalent approach still offers a substantial improvement beyond the status
quo.
V. CONCLUSION
Existing mass tort bankruptcy and legislative mass tort fund procedures
suffer from many inadequacies. To remedy these inadequacies, scholars
have presented several proposals. While these recommendations ameliorate
several existing deficiencies, they do not fully address many of the prob-
lems that plague future claimants in mass tort bankruptcies and legislative
trust funds. This paper offers several novel recommendations for improv-
ing mass tort bankruptcy and trust fund procedures while identifying hith-
erto overlooked flaws in mass tort bankruptcy practice and scholarship.
First, we discussed how future claimants' inability to choose, monitor,
or pay their representatives negatively affects the average compensation re-
ceived by future claimants in a mass tort bankruptcy. To help rectify this
situation, we proposed that future claimants' representatives ("FCRs") re-
ceive a percentage of the total compensation obtained by future claimants.
The percentage-fee approach will help remedy future claimants' handicaps
by ensuring that FCRs self-interestedly pursue a high total return for future
claimants. This approach is notably different from the current method of
hourly compensation for FCRs.
Next, we noted that future claimants do not simply suffer from inade-
quate average compensation, but their compensation is also subject to large
amounts of risk. When the total size of future claims is larger than ex-
pected, individual compensation awards to future claimants tend to be re-
duced. Present claimants, however, are not exposed to this risk. To reduce
the risk-bearing disparity, we recommend the adoption of the variable annu-
ity approach first proposed by Roe. We further recommend the adoption of
a "certainty equivalent approach" (regardless of whether or not the variable
annuity approach is adopted). The certainty equivalent approach awards
extra compensation (on average) to risk-bearing future claimants. These
extra funds help protect future claimants should future claims greatly ex-
257 Risk priority would require more procedural changes and innovations than the certainty equiva-
lent approach. As a result, it is quite possible that the certainty equivalent approach may prove more
workable than risk priority.
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ceed expectations. The size of the extra funds should be determined by the
indifference criterion-the amount that would make a prospective tort
claimant indifferent between receiving the present claimants' guaranteed
compensation and the future claimants' risky compensation with a higher
average value. The size of the premium should be higher when future
claimants' compensation is subject to greater risk, when future claimants
are less wealthy, and when the average size of the mass tort injury is
greater. The certainty equivalent approach represents a sharp break from
current practice, which typically awards greater (or at least equal) compen-
sation to present claimants.
We then discussed the allocation of risk to tort claimants with respect
to other creditors. We noted that relatively impoverished tort claimants are
generally extremely risk-averse. Moreover, undiversified future claimants
are likely to be particularly averse to the risk associated with future claims.
Because tort claimants (and future claimants in particular) will not be able
to negotiate for their desired risk allocation, we recommend that they hold
risk priority. Risk priority concerns the allocation of risk in bankruptcy,
taking as given the distribution of value specified by conventional priority.
Risk priority for tort claimants implies that they should receive the least
risky claims that enable them to obtain the value of the firm specified by
their conventional priority ranking. Thus, debt claims and preferred equity
claims in the reorganized firm should generally be awarded to tort claimants
rather than other creditors. Contract creditors, by contrast, should receive
equity claims on the reorganized firm. Similarly, tort claimants' exposure
to future claimants risk should be minimized. Instead, tort claimants should
receive a relatively fixed amount of compensation (which will generally be
less than the value of their claims) while the value of contract creditors' dis-
tribution should fluctuate with the size of future claims.
These proposals will not eliminate the complications inherent in mass
tort bankruptcies. The size of future claims will still require estimation and
mistakes will be made. The proposals presented here, however, will ensure
that future claimants do not suffer from systematic inequities in mass tort
bankruptcies. They also serve to minimize the costs of the inevitable esti-
mation errors. In total, these proposals further the ongoing process of solv-
ing the "fair distribution problem."
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